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1. Introduction 
 
In the late fall of 2008, when the idea for this paper was beginning to take shape, 
the world was rocked by what was soon to be labeled “the worst financial and 
economic crisis since the Great Depression”. In the wake of plummeting stock 
market prices, the collapse of investment banks and insurance companies, rampant 
home foreclosures and billions of dollars spent on federal bailout plans, the public 
reputation of Wall Street – the once-cherished symbol of American capitalism – 
hit a historic low, and is likely to remain there for some time to come. Politicians 
of all parties were quick to assure voters that their concern was for “average 
people on Main Street” and not for the presumed representatives of “corporate 
greed” on Wall Street. CNN showed desperate bankers and stock brokers 
pilgrimaging to Trinity Church, where they were hoping – so viewers were told – 
to contemplate their situation and maybe find some kind of inspiration from 
above.  
 
 Roughly around the same time – but on a far smaller scale – events in a 
quite different part of the globe were beginning to attract the attention of the 
western world. Navigation in the Gulf of Aden – the chokepoint of maritime trade 
between Europe and Asia – was increasingly threatened by Somali pirates 
hijacking cargo ships or tankers and releasing them only for considerable 
ransoms. In response to this worrying situation, the European Union, with UN and 
NATO backing, mounted an anti-piracy operation, uniting warships from different 
European countries in a single task force mandated to repel or arrest pirates trying 
to seize control of merchant ships. From time to time, pictures taken by EU 
vessels or by crewmembers of a hijacked ship appeared in the media, showing 
groups of dangerous looking young black men with rifles, semi-automatic pistols 
and even rocket launchers. Rather infrequently, the question was asked why 
someone would risk his life by using a tiny fishing boat to capture a gigantic 
cargo ship. Raging poverty in Somalia and over-exploitation of fishing grounds 
along the East African coast by international fishing fleets were sometimes 
mentioned in articles or TV reports.  
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 Even if – for obvious reasons – no case of attempted mutiny and summary 
hanging on board a British man-of-war can be adduced to complete the picture, it 
is clear from the above examples that anyone writing about Melville’s short 
fiction in the year 2009 need not look far to find events that testify to the 
continuing relevance of issues that occupied Melville more than one hundred 
years ago and inspired him to write some of his finest pieces of prose fiction. Yet 
despite the apparent reminiscences, it is important to emphasize that it is not only 
the décor of such stories as “Bartleby, the Scrivener”, “Benito Cereno” and Billy 
Budd, Sailor that one reencounters in present-day reports about Wall Street and 
Somali pirates. If stock brokers walking down Wall Street to Trinity Church 
inevitably remind us of that 1853 “Story of Wall-Street” in which a lawyer “one 
Sunday morning … happened to go to Trinity Church”, the more fascinating 
parallel is the questioning of the moral integrity of people on Wall Street that is 
now more en vogue than Melville probably could ever have imagined. And if 
reading the lines “Captain Delano … saw the Negroes … flourishing hatchets and 
knives, in ferocious piratical revolt” one cannot help but think of those modern-
day pirates sporting assault-rifles and semi-automatic pistols, the more relevant 
point of similarity lies in the question of how such acts of piracy ought to be 
judged on a moral scale. Are those pirates simply vicious because they act 
unlawfully in an attempt to enrich themselves or are they innocent because sheer 
poverty forces them to act the way they do? Or are we dealing with an ambiguous 
situation that allows for no simple and definite moral evaluation?  
 
 Questions such as these – generalizable into the paramount question of 
what constitutes moral and immoral actions – inform all of Melville’s writing and, 
to a large degree, account for its continuing appeal. Some of the most probing 
examinations of the human capacity for good and evil can be found in the short 
stories and novellas that Melville wrote for Putnam’s Monthly Magazine between 
1853 and 1856. Two of these stories will be looked at in this paper: “Bartleby, the 
Scrivener” (1853) and “Benito Cereno” (1855). While the former examines the 
reaction of a prudent Wall Street lawyer to an infuriatingly unresponsive 
scrivener, the latter follows a good-natured American sea captain on board a 
mysterious Spanish slave ship. Although very different in setting and what one 
might call “surface topic” – Wall Street capitalism on the one hand and slavery on 
3 
the other – both stories have a very similar basic configuration: a confident person 
is unexpectedly confronted with the mysterious “other” that challenges his snug 
and comfortable outlook on life. In both cases, this other figure – Bartleby, Benito 
Cereno and Babo – is dead by the end of the story and the reader is left with the 
nagging question of who is to blame for what has happened. This basic pattern 
also applies to a short novel which Melville began thirty years after writing for 
Putnam’s and which was left unfinished at his death in 1891. Billy Budd, Sailor 
(1924) shows yet another “man of the world” who is – literally – caught between 
the devil and the deep blue sea, the devil being the iniquitous master-at-arms and 
the deep blue sea being the blue-eyed Handsome Sailor. While all three stories 
thus invite moral judgment of their non-title characters, they never openly 
prescribe what kind of verdict readers should pass on them. It does not come as a 
surprise, therefore, that 20th-century critics have proposed radically contrasting 
evaluations of the characters that are involved in these stories.
1
  
 
 In my following analysis, I do not pretend to suggest a completely novel 
approach which is capable of resolving all the critical debates surrounding the 
various characters of Melville’s short fiction. I am confident, however, that by 
pursuing a comparative approach and by considering several interpretative aspects 
simultaneously I will be able to offer some new insight into the nature of the 
moral dilemmata that Melville examines and the kind of conclusion that readers 
are encouraged to reach. The most important aspect that will be considered is the 
way in which Melville uses narrative technique – and in particular point of view – 
in describing morally ambiguous situations. The formal differences between the 
                                                 
1
 In the case of “Benito Cereno”, earlier critics readily assigned the label “evil” to the black 
“pirates” (Cf. Rosalie Feltenstein, “Melville’s ‘Benito Cereno’”. American Literature 19.3 (1947): 
245-55), whereas more recent interpretations focus on the wrongdoings of the whites in the context 
of colonization and slavery (Cf. Allan Moore Emery, “The Topicality of Depravity in ‘Benito 
Cereno’”. American Literature 55.3 (1983): 316-31). Some condemn the Wall Street lawyer of 
“Bartleby” because he fails to live up to the Christian imperative of love (Cf. William Bysshe 
Stein, “Bartleby: the Christian Conscience”. Bartleby the Scrivener. Kent: The Kent State 
University Press, 1966. 104-12), while others tend to exculpate him because they believe that he 
should not be judged by such high standards (Cf. Harold Schechter, “Bartleby the Chronometer”. 
Studies in Short Fiction 19.4 (1982): 359-66). Similarly, some critics feel that Melville clearly 
condemns Captain Vere for executing Billy Budd (Cf. Joyce Sparer Adler, “Billy Budd and 
Melville’s Philosophy of War”. Publications of the Modern Language Association 91.2 (1976): 
266-78), while others argue that he supplies so many mitigating circumstances that Vere emerges 
as a dutiful captain who is committed to maintaining order on board his ship for the sake of 
protecting the safety and freedom of Britain and the world (Cf. Christopher W. Sten, “Vere’s Use 
of the ‘Forms’: Means and Ends in Billy Budd”. American Literature 47. 1 (1975): 37-51). 
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first-person narrator of “Bartleby”, the limited point of view employed in “Benito 
Cereno” and the omniscient narrator of Billy Budd are readily perceivable. But 
how exactly does the choice of one particular perspective determine our 
understanding and evaluation of the actions of the morally challenged protagonists 
in these stories? A secondary aspect that can help answer this question is the use 
of Christian and classical imagery and allusions. Again, Melville’s penchant for 
metaphors drawn from the spheres of Christian religion and classical antiquity is 
apparent in any of his works. Yet how are the two categories made to interact in 
the three stories here considered and what does this tell us about the message that 
the narrator intends to convey? A final aspect, which will not be considered 
independently, but in conjunction with the two aspects just mentioned, is the 
construction of character constellations. How does the use of a particular point of 
view and a certain combination of Christian and/or classical images contribute to 
the description of the main characters of the stories and how do they relate to one 
another? Of particular interest in this context is of course the central non-title 
character facing a morally difficult situation.  
 
 The more general aspects just mentioned translate into largely comparable 
approaches in the analysis and interpretation of the three texts that will be 
considered. In the case of “Bartleby”, the narrator will first be shown to be a 
conscious narrator who uses the piece of literature he composes for an extended 
self-portrait and as a means of contemplating his situation in life. It will become 
clear that his use of Christian and classical imagery hints at an understanding of 
what is right and wrong and some – partial – awareness of his own moral 
deficiency. The figure of Bartleby, as well as the other three office clerks, will be 
seen to function as fictitious constituents of the process of introspection that the 
lawyer engages in. In dealing with “Benito Cereno”, the deliberate structuring of 
the story and the conspicuous parallels between the first part and the deposition in 
the second part will be examined. The narrator, as will become apparent, 
deliberately uses a limited point of view in order to condemn the “good-natured” 
American Amasa Delano, who is wholly unaware of the actual power relations on 
board the San Dominick. The use of Christian imagery will be shown to add to the 
indictment of European colonization in particular and Western arrogance and 
racism in general. Billy Budd, finally, will emerge as the most conspicuously 
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incongruous of all three texts, both with regard to the omniscient narrator, who 
does not seem to follow any identifiable ideological agenda, and to the use of 
Christian and classical allusions, which, unlike in “Bartleby”, are not used to 
contrast clearly discernible moral categories. It will be concluded that if 
Melville’s last work is also his most ambiguous, this is due to the way in which 
the narrator misleads the reader by confronting him with hopelessly incoherent 
and contradictory pieces of information.  
 
 
 
2. “Bartleby, the Scrivener” – The inscrutable lawyer 
 
2.1.The self-conscious narrator  
 
After all that has been said about Bartleby’s nameless employer, there is still one 
peculiarity about him that I think is worth pointing out, namely his role as a self-
conscious narrator. The lawyer’s awareness of this role is particularly obvious in 
the first and final paragraphs of “Bartleby”, which contain several instances of 
explicit reference to the process of writing a story and presenting it to a reader. At 
the very beginning of the story, the narrator underlines the novelty of his subject 
matter – scriveners – by saying that “nothing that I know of has ever been 
written” (3) about them. He then specifies that his narrative will not be about one 
of the ordinary representatives of this “somewhat singular set of men”
2
 (3), but 
about one particular law-copyist – “the strangest I ever saw or heard of” (3). 
Having thus defined his topic, the narrator has more to say about the nature of his 
narrative. Although he calls it a “biography” (3), he is aware that it is not a very 
prototypical one, given the lack of “materials” and “original sources” (3) that a 
biographer normally draws on. By referring to this lack of information as a 
“irreparable loss to literature” (3) he seems to imply that his account of Bartleby is 
not strictly speaking a biography but rather a piece of literature. For the rest of the 
story the narrator refrains from commenting on his writing. Yet once the actual 
                                                 
2
 Herman Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor and Selected Tales. Ed. Robert Milder (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) 3. All page references in this Zulassungsarbeit – including the chapters on 
“Benito Cereno” and Billy Budd – will be to this edition and will be given in the text.  
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narrative of Bartleby has come to a end, the narrator intervenes again, referring 
twice to the story he has just told (“this history” (40), “this little narrative” (40)) 
and also to himself, “the present narrator” (41).  
 
 It is important to note that the lawyer’s awareness of his role as a narrator 
is not limited to such meta-narrative reflections about his authorship and the 
nature of his writing. Making use of the narrative power at his disposal, he adds 
two segments to his account of Bartleby’s life, which are decisive to our 
understanding of the relation between the lawyer and his mysterious scrivener. 
The first of these supplements is “one little item of rumor” (41) that the narrator 
recounts “ere parting with the reader” (40) and that he announces at the outset of 
his story as a “vague report which will appear in the sequel” (3). Although the 
lawyer is fully aware of the uncertain veracity of this piece of information, he 
feels the need to include it in his narrative. The reason for this feeling may well be 
that this dubious piece of information does not pertain so much to the 
unaccountable scrivener, but to the lawyer himself. The rumor he chooses to relate 
– “that Bartleby had been a subordinate clerk in the Dead Letter Office at 
Washington, from which he had been suddenly removed by a change in the 
administration” (41) – recalls the lawyer’s own fate, which he laments at the 
beginning of the story: “I consider the sudden and violent abrogation of the office 
of Master in Chancery, by the new Constitution, as a – premature act” (4). This 
striking analogy would also explain why the lawyer asserts that “this vague report 
has not been without a certain strange suggestive interest to me” (41). The 
suggestiveness of Bartleby’s fate stems from the fact that it represents a 
marginally modified account of his own change in fortune.  
 
 The second segment that the narrator adds to the bare account of 
Bartleby’s life is even more clearly concerned with his own personality and 
professional life. The lawyer is quite emphatic about the necessity of including 
this section: “Ere introducing the scrivener … it is fit I make some mention of 
myself, my employés, my business, my chambers, and general surroundings; 
because some such description is indispensable to an adequate understanding of 
the chief character about to be presented” (3). What then follows is largely 
consistent with the lawyer’s announcement. After a short description of the lawyer 
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himself and his office a rather lengthy portrait of his three clerks is drawn up. 
How “indispensable to an adequate understanding” of Bartleby can this kind of 
information really be? While some of the information in the introductory passage 
– about the layout of the office and the clerks’ character traits, for example – may 
give us a clearer idea of some of the later events, such as Bartleby’s “dead-wall 
reveries” (21) and the clerks’ changing reactions to his inexplicable behavior, 
none of it is strictly speaking relevant to an understanding of who or what 
Bartleby really is. If the lawyer insists that “some such description is 
indispensable”, this is because he uses it for a presentation of his own character 
and station in life. Seen from this perspective, “Bartleby” appears to be less the 
scrivener’s biography than the lawyer’s autobiography.  
 
 Substantiating proof of this claim can be found by examining the line of 
characterizations that the lawyer follows in describing first himself, then his clerks 
and finally his experiences with Bartleby. The first part, in which the lawyer talks 
about himself, is a rather candid self-portrait of an homme moyen who is aware of 
his professional limitations – “I am one of those unambitious lawyers” (3) – and 
his pronounced desire for an ordered, comfortable and largely uneventful life. 
Hence his assertion that “the easiest way of life is the best” (3) and his insistence 
that his acquaintances consider him “an eminently safe man” (4). It should not be 
forgotten that these character traits are brought to our knowledge by the lawyer 
himself. This does not mean, however, that he is conscious of all his negative 
qualities or that he is totally outspoken about all aspects concerning his 
professional activities. His triple reference to John Jacob Astor not only betrays a 
certain air of vanity, but also points to Astor’s utilitarian philosophy and the 
unfortunate role he played in the foreclosure of defaulting debtors’ homes
3
 – 
associations the lawyer prefers to suppress because they would shed a dubious 
light on his treatment of Bartleby. The mention of the office of Master in 
Chancery is another example of this technique. The lawyer self-revealingly 
complains about the abrogation of this “pleasantly remunerative” (4) office, which 
would have earned him “a life-lease of the profits” (4), but he loses no word about 
                                                 
3
 Cf. Mario D’Avanzo, “Melville’s ‘Bartleby’ and John Jacob Astor”. The New England Quarterly 
41.2 (1968): 259-64 and Thomas Dilworth, “Narrator of ‘Bartleby’: The Christian-Humanist 
Acquaintance of John Jacob Astor”. Papers on Language and Literature 38.1 (2002): 49-75. 
8 
the responsibilities this office normally includes. This is hardly surprising because 
in doing so he would have to admit that it normally involves the hearing of home 
foreclosure cases.
4
 Even more damaging is perhaps the lawyer’s inadvertent 
avowal that he only indulges in “dangerous indignation at wrongs and outrages” 
(4) when his own financial interests are concerned. All things considered, one can 
conclude that the limited sense of self-awareness that is perceptible in the lawyer 
is severely curtailed by conceit, complacence and the importance he attaches to 
money. 
 
 Whether one finds this analysis too lenient or too harsh, there can be no 
doubt that the lawyer’s self-characterization is plainly worded, firmly grounded in 
reality and the reader has no reason to believe that the narrator wants him to 
understand more than he says. This matter-of-fact tone changes when the narrator 
turns to a description of his three office clerks, in particular Nippers and Turkey. 
Both clerks are described in a way that underlines their “ordinarily human” (12) 
character, thereby setting them apart from their co-worker Bartleby. This concerns 
both their outward appearance – Turkey being “a short, pursy Englishman” (5) 
and Nippers “a whiskered, sallow, and … rather piratical-looking young man” (7) 
– and their behavior while they are at work. Turkey sometimes “made an 
unpleasant racket with his chair; spilled his sand-box; in mending his pens, 
impatiently split them all to pieces, and threw them on to the floor in a sudden 
passion” (5), and Nippers, plagued by “ambition and indigestion” (7), “could 
never get his table to suit him. He put chips under it, blocks of various sorts, bits 
of pasteboard, and at last went so far as to attempt an exquisite adjustment by final 
pieces of folded blotting paper” (7). All of this is very much in the vein of realistic 
character portrayal. So much so that the two law-copyists have been taken to be 
an illustration of the Marxist doctrine of social alienation in capitalist societies.
5
 
Yet this down-to-earth tone does not remain unchanged during the whole segment 
dedicated to the lawyer’s clerks. The narrator also offers a metaphorical 
description of their changing moods that is so obviously an artificial adaptation of 
reality that readers are forced to surmise that it is intended to do more than just 
describe the eccentricities of two office employees. We are told that Turkey’s face 
                                                 
4
 Dilworth, “Narrator of ‘Bartleby’”, 65-67. 
5
 Louise K. Barnett, “Bartleby as Alienated Worker”. Studies in Short Fiction 11 (1974): 379-85. 
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“was of a fine florid hue, but after twelve o’clock, meridian … it blazed like a 
grate full of Christmas coals; and continued blazing – but, as it were, with a 
gradual wane – till 6 o’clock, P.M.” (5). Despite the Christmas coals simile, this is 
still a rather inconspicuous description of Turkey’s alcohol-induced ruddiness. A 
second simile, comparing the clerk’s blazing face with the regular path of the sun 
in the sky (5), goes one step further in highlighting the deliberately contrived 
regularity of the process, linking two wholly unrelated phenomena – the clerk’s 
face and the sun. The rationale behind the narrator’s insistence on Turkey’s 
gradually changing complexion – and mood – becomes apparent when the second 
clerk is described and the reader learns that “the irritability and consequent 
nervousness of Nippers, were mainly observable in the morning, while in the 
afternoon he was comparatively mild” (9). The narrator makes sure the reader 
perceives the complementarity involved in this description of the clerks by 
pointing out that their “fits relieved each other like guards. When Nippers’ was 
on, Turkey’s was off; and vice versa” (9). Mildly humorous in tone, this simile 
confirms that the narrator, by ostensibly talking about his employees, reveals one 
of his own character traits: He likes things to be neatly ordered and arranged in a 
way that makes them controllable, rationalizable – profitable. His concluding 
remark, “This was a good natural arrangement under the circumstances” (9) must 
be taken to be unintentionally ironic, considering the measures he takes to contain 
the effects of Turkey’s “irrational” afternoon moods. When his suggestion that 
Turkey work only in the morning (6) is turned down, he accepts to keep him full 
time, “resolving, nevertheless, to see to it, that during the afternoon he had to do 
with my less important papers” (6-7). Far from being a credibly natural 
arrangement, the office clerks’ taking turns at being irritable – or, rather, the way 
in which their employer describes and responds to this phenomenon – bespeaks 
the lawyer’s efforts to contain and rationalize forces leading to disturbance and 
unproductiveness.  
 
 Turkey’s and Nipper’s nature is thus twofold. They are realistically 
rendered office workers, but they are also symbolic figures used to disclose the 
lawyer’s personality. In addition to the formalized language he uses to describe 
them, there are even more explicit statements regarding the values that are dear to 
this Wall Street man. The coat he offers his unseemly clerk Turkey (“a highly-
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respectable looking coat of my own, a padded gray coat, of a most comfortable 
warmth, and which buttoned straight up from the knee to the neck” (8)) not only 
indicates his desire for propriety and his attempt to contain – “button up” – 
irrational behavior, it also links the clerks and their symbolic function to the 
unaccountable Bartleby. The lawyer is twice shown buttoning himself up before 
attempting to dismiss his resistant employee. In the first case, where he lawyer 
tells Bartleby to “quit this place” (26), the link between the buttoning of the coat 
and the dismissal is even more explicit than in the second case (“What shall I do? 
what ought I to do?” (33)), where the lawyer seems to be reasoning with himself 
about the right course of action and the buttoning up of his “highly-respectable 
looking coat” must be interpreted as a metaphor for his gathering his faculties and 
assuring himself that he is still capable of controlling elements which intrude the 
peace and quiet of his carefully rationalized world. What is important in both 
cases is that the lawyer, by acting on himself, is actually trying to act on Bartleby. 
The coat thus serves to link the lawyer and Bartleby and can even be taken to 
contribute to the conflation of their identities. The role of the clerks, in this 
context, is to prepare the reader for a symbolic understanding of the relations that 
hold between the lawyer and his employees. The symbolic overtones that are 
perceptible when the lawyer wraps Turkey in a gray
6
 coat of his prepare the reader 
for the more far-reaching implications of the lawyer’s buttoning himself up while 
trying to interact with Bartleby.  
 
 Leaving all these symbolic interpretations aside, two instances of the 
lawyer’s using his clerks to describe his own personality can be detected by 
looking at the reasons he himself gives for keeping his employees despite their 
obvious professional shortcomings. Talking about Turkey, he says that “he was in 
many ways a most valuable person to me, … accomplishing a great deal of work 
in a style not easy to be matched” (6). His evaluation of Nippers is hardly 
                                                 
6
 The fact that the coat is gray corroborates a symbolic interpretation insofar as the color gray is 
used to link the lawyer – it is his coat –, the clerks – the coat is given to one of them – and 
Bartleby, who has gray eyes (12). In “Benito Cereno”, the “gray surtout” (164) of the opening 
scene serves to alert the reader to the ambiguities of the story and warns against drawing clear 
lines of demarcation between its characters and their supposed moral quality. Even if the color 
gray is much less prominent in “Bartleby” than in “Benito Cereno”, it still makes sense to assume 
that the grayness associated with all characters of the story has a comparable meaning. It is 
supposed to sensitize readers to the possibility that the clerks are not individually defined persons, 
but symbolic devices the lawyer makes use of in the process of composing his self-portrait.  
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different: “But with all his failings, and the annoyances he caused me, Nippers … 
was a very useful man to me; wrote a neat, swift hand” (7-8). The lawyer carefully 
weighs the gains he makes and the losses he incurs by not dismissing his 
subordinates and is clearly not motivated by any kind of charitable feeling. This 
utilitarian mindset, which recalls the lawyer’s early reference to John Jacob Astor, 
is certainly among the most damning revelations he makes about his striving for 
“pleasantly remunerative” arrangements – at least in the domain of his 
professional life. Yet, for the sake of fairness, one passage which shows the 
lawyer to be more humane and compassionate, should not be overlooked. When 
Turkey is criticized for blotting his copies, he replies, “with submission, sir, 
behold these hairs! I am getting old … With submission, sir, we both are getting 
old” (6). The lawyer’s comment, “This appeal to my fellow-feeling was hardly to 
be resisted” (6) is very similar to his later realization that the “bond of a common 
humanity” (20) links him to his miserable office clerk Bartleby. What is even 
more, in both cases the lawyer does not follow up on his more charitable impulse, 
but falls back on his possessiveness and his utilitarian philosophy. In the first 
case, he makes arrangements for Turkey to handle less important documents in 
the afternoon; in the second case, he secretly examines Bartleby’s desk, justifying 
his intrusiveness with the revealing remark, “… besides, the desk is mine, and its 
contents too” (21). This final example once again shows that there are strong 
parallels between the lawyer’s description of his dealings with Turkey and 
Nippers and the things he later tells us about his experiences with Bartleby.  
 
 After all those observations concerning Turkey and Nippers, one question 
concerning the lawyer-narrator remains. How self-conscious can we reasonably 
consider him to be? Is he aware that all the information he gives us about Turkey 
and Nippers serves to describe his own character, that – metaphorically speaking 
– they are the surface on which his vapory personality condenses and becomes 
visible? Does he use this narrative device deliberately? The lawyer’s indication 
that “some such description [of the clerks] is indispensable to an adequate 
understanding of the chief character about to be presented” suggests that he is 
indeed aware of what he is doing. If his aim were really to write Bartleby’s 
biography, he would sooner or later realize that the whole section devoted to 
Turkey and Nippers does nothing to improve a reader’s understanding of 
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Bartleby’s life and ultimate fate. Since it does give us a rather clear idea of the 
kind of life the lawyer leads, one might surmise that the introductory section has 
been included to prepare readers for “an adequate understanding” not of Bartleby, 
but of the metaphorical nature of the subsequent part of the story which is devoted 
to Bartleby, and which – as we will see – functions in exactly the same way as the 
introductory section. Ultimately, whether or not the lawyer follows a narrative 
strategy remains impossible to decide because there are simply not enough 
explicit meta-fictional comments. It is true that many remarks that implicate 
disclosures of the lawyer’s personality seem to be voluntary on the part of 
Melville, but rather unintentional on the part of the narrator. This allows for two 
interpretations: Either the lawyer, in the first part of “Bartleby” at least, really has 
no more than a very limited awareness of the effect of his narrative choices, or he 
is in fact conscious of the broader metaphorical framework that he has designed 
for his story, but from time to time, due to the incomplete nature of his self-
consciousness, inadvertently slips into self-revelatory remarks about his 
employees.  
 
 
2.2.The lawyer and Bartleby 
 
Following the short introductory section presenting Turkey, Nippers and Ginger 
Nut, the narrator immediately introduces Bartleby. Not only does the 
unaccountable scrivener fulfill the same professional function as his co-workers, 
he also has the same narrative function.
7
 Certainly less of a realistic character than 
Turkey and Nippers, he is even more susceptible to an interpretation that 
identifies him as a narrative device which the narrator – again, more or less 
consciously – uses in the process of meditating on his own self and his own life. 
Two facts about the scrivener confirm this interpretation. Firstly, Bartleby is 
continually described in a way that makes it difficult to perceive of him as a real 
and living human being. Secondly, there is a certain number of details in the 
lawyer’s narrative that suggest a resemblance between Bartleby and the lawyer 
himself. 
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 What may be most remarkable about Bartleby is the fact that his physical 
existence is much less firmly established than that of the other office clerks. As in 
the case of Turkey and Nippers, it is the way in which the lawyer-narrator refers 
and reacts to Bartleby that fashions our understanding of the scrivener’s nature 
and calls into question the reality of his existence. This concerns first of all the 
lawyer’s insistence that no materials exist for an objective verification of 
Bartleby’s identity and that his narrative is no more than a transcription of his 
personal experiences (3). This emphasis on the limited scope of information that 
is available to the lawyer can be seen to suggest that Bartleby – much more than 
his co-workers Turkey and Nippers – is merely a figment of the lawyer’s mind 
which serves to further elaborate his own self-portrait. Many of the lawyer’s 
remarks that seem to emphasize the scrivener’s mysteriousness as a person can be 
adduced to confirm this interpretation. The observation that Bartleby never utters 
a word unless he is spoken to, never goes to dinner and “eats nothing but ginger-
nuts” (15) makes it almost impossible to perceive him as a human being. The fact 
that he never leaves the office (14) suggests that Bartleby’s existence is not only 
limited to the office space but also bound to the presence of the lawyer and his 
perception of the scrivener. The metaphorical nature of Bartleby that this 
interpretation implies is confirmed by the hyperbolic observation that Bartleby 
“seemed alone, absolutely alone in the universe. A bit of wreck in the mid 
Atlantic” (26). This metaphorical reference to the supposed fact that Bartleby has 
no relatives makes of him a prototypical “charity case”, a symbolic incentive for 
the lawyer to look beyond his office world and take notice of his shipwrecked 
fellow men.
8
 
 
 The material existence of Bartleby is further challenged by a rather 
practical contrivance of the lawyer’s. The folding screen that he puts up around 
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Bartleby’s desk (10) effectively effaces the most distinct aspect of the scrivener’s 
reality, which is his visibility, so that in many instances the other characters of the 
story perceive merely acoustic reverberations of his existence. Interestingly, this 
remaining aspect of his existence is undermined by the lawyer’s frequent 
reference to Bartleby’s noiselessness: He is characterized as “silent” no less than 
eight times and the epithet “noiseless” is used twice.  
 
 Apart from the frequent use of adjectives and adverbs denoting 
noiselessness, the language that the lawyer uses to describe Bartleby offers several 
other indications that he does not intend to present Bartleby as a real-life 
character. Bartleby is described as “pale” or “pallid” 14 times, and the notion of 
lifelessness implied by these adjectives is enforced by the triple use of the word 
“cadaverous”. It should also be noted that it is the lawyer who applies the 
adjective “dead” to the walls that Bartleby stares at and that it is also he who 
decides to include the rumor about the Dead Letter Office, which again links 
Bartleby to the motif of death. Another characterization which belongs to the 
sphere of supernatural phenomena is the lawyer’s use of the word “ghost”. Not 
only is the word used to exclude Bartleby from the realm of human beings (“this 
man, or rather ghost” (33)), it also introduces one of the typical paraphernalia of 
magic – the number three, which is normally associated with ghost stories and 
fairy tales: “Like a very ghost, agreeably to the laws of magical invocation, at the 
third summons, he appeared at the entrance of his hermitage” (17). This number is 
not only used to underline the ghost-like, i.e. unreal, nature of Bartleby, it also 
appears on a much subtler level; it is enmeshed in the micro-structure of the plot. 
The period of time spanning from Bartleby’s arrival to the lawyer’s remark that he 
has become accustomed to the scrivener’s eccentricities (10-17) consists of 
precisely three instances of refusal to work on the part of Bartleby. In each of 
these cases of resistance Bartleby’s infamous “I would prefer not to” is uttered 
thrice.
9
 The same pattern occurs later in the story, when the scrivener uses his 
mysterious “I am not particular” three times in his replies to the lawyer. This 
deliberately artificial structure not only highlights Bartleby’s symbolic nature as a 
character, it also suggests a reconsideration of the meaning of the number three 
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and its relation to the scrivener. While it certainly makes sense to include the 
number in a list of Christian allusions in the story, it should also be considered 
outside a Christian context. The omnipresence of the number three in many non-
Christian religions, in ancient mythology and in philosophy is obvious enough. 
Less evident in the context of “Bartleby” is the fact that the number also has its 
place in literary theory. From Aristotle’s specification that a drama should have a 
beginning, a middle and an end to the introduction-main part-conclusion structure 
of any term paper, the number three has always served to impose a structure on 
pieces of literature, or indeed any piece of writing. On a more microscopic level, 
the tricolon  is certainly among the most universally used rhetorical figures, 
linking Cesar’s “veni, vidi, vici” to Barack Obama’s “yes we can” rhetoric. If the 
use of such tripartite structures draws attention to an author’s conscious effort to 
shape his narrative, the lawyer’s arrangement of the scrivener’s utterances and 
actions in threefold structures – in combination with the way in which he casts 
doubt on the reality of Bartleby’s existence – indicates that the scrivener is not 
meant to be understood as a real person and that readers are encouraged to apply a 
truly symbolic reading to his supposed “biography”.  
 
 In addition to the elements just mentioned, there are other peculiarities 
which support the thesis that the lawyer and the scrivener are not two distinct 
persons, but that the latter is the product of the former’s imagination. First of all, 
the incongruence between the lawyer’s inability to act on Bartleby and the 
scrivener’s influence on his employer must be addressed. Independently of what 
the lawyer intends to do, the fact remains that throughout the narrative he cannot 
bring himself to enforce Bartleby’s dismissal. The most striking instance of this 
inability is the lawyer’s exasperated threat “I shall feel bound – indeed I am bound 
– to – to – to quit the premises myself!” (36). The suspension of the final verb of 
action – and the fact that the verb, when it is uttered, indicates an action that 
impinges on the lawyer himself – suggests that Bartleby’s employer is inhibited 
by some interior force to act on the unyielding scrivener. Interestingly, the only 
influence that the lawyer is both willing and able to exert on Bartleby is of a 
similarly “interior” nature. Adhering to a peculiar “doctrine of assumptions” (29) 
the lawyer makes prospective (“I assumed the ground that depart he must” (27)) 
and even retrospective (“… now I might retrospectively assume that departed he 
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was” (29)) assumptions about the scrivener’s behavior. He goes as far as to 
assume that “pretending not to see Bartleby at all, [he might] walk straight against 
him as if he were air” (29). This is a surprising approach for a man who prides 
himself on his “prudence” and “method”. It is less surprising if we take this 
doctrine to be a psychological response to an interior process. If Bartleby is part 
of such a psychological process, it would indeed make sense for the lawyer to try 
to convince himself that he is capable of controlling it by sheer will power.  
 
 A psychological reading is further supported by the scrivener’s influence 
on the lawyer, which is also marked by the absence of any kind of physical 
interaction. The lawyer cannot grasp this “wondrous ascendancy” (28) and 
vaguely speaks of “something about Bartleby that not only strangely disarmed me, 
but in a wonderful manner touched and disconcerted me” (13). This ascendancy 
not only causes the lawyer to obey orders given by his employee (19), it also has a 
tellingly psychological effect on his language (“I had got into the way of 
involuntarily using this word ‘prefer’” (24)) and on that of his office clerks. 
Considering the narrative function of the office clerks and the points of similarity 
between the lawyer, his clerks and Bartleby that have already been mentioned, the 
lawyer’s insistence that Bartleby’s mental influence pertains not only to himself 
but also to his clerks (25) suggests that this influence does not operate between 
Bartleby and his employer, but that it is a visible sign of a psychological process 
going on in the lawyer’s mind. 
 
 A final point that is worth mentioning concerns some further similarities 
between the lawyer and his mysterious employee. Apart from their common 
experience of losing a job due to a change in the political system, they also 
display some surprising physical and character-related resemblances: The lawyer 
is “safe” and “prudent”; the scrivener is of “singularly sedate an aspect” (10). The 
lawyer’s concern for respectable and decorous demeanor – he complains about 
Turkey’s “indecorous” (5) behavior – is mirrored by his description of Bartleby, 
who is both “respectable” (10) and “eminently decorous” (19). Finally, the short 
reference to the lawyer’s trip in his rockaway contains the remark “In fact I almost 
lived in my rockaway for the time” (37), which is strangely reminiscent of the 
lawyer’s discovery that Bartleby has made his home in his employer’s Wall Street 
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office. These examples show that, despite his continuing exasperation at the 
scrivener’s behavior, the lawyer continually inserts pieces of information in his 
narrative which support the thesis that the different groups of characters – 
Bartleby, his clerks and himself – are not to be seen as distinct entities, but rather 
as three different embodiments of one entity – the lawyer. 
 
 
2.3. The inner conflict of the lawyer 
 
As the preceding chapters have shown, the narrator of “Bartleby” provides a large 
amount of information that allows us to read his account as a piece of serious self-
reflection. If this is so, then the narrator’s announcement that he is not interested 
in telling the story of some queer scrivener, “at which good-natured gentlemen 
might smile, and sentimental souls might weep” (3), acquires a much deeper 
meaning than might be evident upon first reading the lawyer’s introductory 
remarks. Far from relating a singular case for the sake of merriment or emotional 
agitation, the lawyer gives the moral interest of his story a much broader scope. 
Against the background of the narrator’s efforts to set off the clerks’ and 
Bartleby’s unrealistic and functional nature from his own realistically rounded 
character, his final exclamation “Ah Bartleby! Ah humanity!” (41) may even be 
taken to imply that his concern extends to an all-mankind-embracing exploration 
of what defines moral and immoral behavior.  
 
 Even if this far-reaching approach is rejected, the lawyer’s keen interest in 
his own moral constitution and actions cannot be denied. In fact, the examination 
of his own moral conduct is a logical continuation of his description of the office 
clerks and Bartleby, which also serves the purpose of allowing the reader to grasp 
the lawyer’s character. The most interesting aspect of this continued self-
examination is the revelation that the lawyer’s psyche is defined by the existence 
of two distinct and conflicting principles. The constant oscillation between these 
principles, which may most concisely be labeled “charity” and “reason”, has been 
noted by a number of critics who have examined the relationship between the 
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scrivener and his employer.
10
 In two more recent studies, Thomas Dilworth and 
Steven Ryan
11
 reconsider the lawyer’s internal conflict by paying special attention 
to his use of Christian and classical allusions.
 
As they convincingly show, 
metaphors drawn from the spheres of Christian religion and classical antiquity are 
used in a very coherent way to denote the two philosophic sources from which the 
lawyer draws in his reaction to his employee’s unaccountable behavior. Ryan, 
who focuses on the importance of references to Cicero as a paragon of pre-
Christian philosophy, highlights one particular scene in which a classical 
understanding of love and friendship, as expressed by the ancient Roman lawyer 
in his treatise Laelius de amicitia, is particularly relevant to an adequate 
interpretation of the lawyer’s behavior towards Bartleby. While the lawyer, 
“resolved … to dismiss” (23) his defaulting employee, talks to Bartleby, the 
scrivener fixes his gaze on the lawyer’s bust of Cicero. He even displays “the 
faintest conceivable tremor of the white attenuated mouth” (23), which is, as Ryan 
correctly observes, “the most emotion Bartleby displays within the entire story”.
12
 
This incidence is denotative of the influence of classical reasonableness on the 
lawyer’s thoughts and behavior. According to Cicero’s writings, genuine 
friendship is always subject to one central condition, which is the virtue of the 
person that is to be accepted as a friend. Given Bartleby’s outrageous lack of 
virtue, the lawyer, from Cicero’s point of view, is thus not blameworthy for 
failing to accept and love Bartleby as a friend. Ryan insists that Cicero’s 
philosophy “is concerned with reasonable generosity”
13
 and that, according to this 
concept, generosity is a desirous quality only if its distribution is governed by 
reason. The outcome of this postulated conjunction is the “prudentially generous 
man”
14
 who bestows his philanthropy according to the potential beneficiary’s 
qualities and merits. This Ciceronian concept is clearly present in the passage 
introduced above: The lawyer asks Bartleby “what reasonable objection” (23; my 
italics) he may possibly have to speak to him; he is irritated by his employee’s 
blank refusal to answer because “his perverseness seemed ungrateful” (23; my 
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italics). Bartleby has shown himself to be unworthy of any token of friendship or 
support, hence the lawyer, as a reasonable man, cannot be expected to squander 
his helpfulness despite the scrivener’s want of virtue. It is important to note, 
however, that the lawyer is not influenced by this particular mindset alone. The 
passage at hand shows very clearly that there is a constant co-occurrence of 
patterns of behavior determined by reason and incentives of charity urging the 
lawyer to comply with the example set by Jesus in the New Testament. Indeed, 
the lawyer’s complaint about Bartleby is immediately followed by a moment of – 
apparently unworldly – inspiration which exhorts him to be lenient towards 
Bartleby: “I strangely felt something superstitious knocking at my heart … 
denouncing me for a villain if I dared to breathe one bitter word against this 
forlornest of mankind” (23; my italics).  
 
 This example is by no means singular in the text. Talking about the first 
two instances of refusal on the part of Bartleby, the lawyer uses two pieces of 
imagery, the first of which is classical (“my pale plaster-of-Paris bust of Cicero” 
(12)) and the second of which is Christian (“I was turned into a pillar of salt” 
(13)).
15
 This scene functions as a template which establishes a dual set of 
categories that can be used to classify the totality of the lawyer’s feelings and 
actions pertaining to his employee. While the rational category is defined in terms 
of Cicero’s philosophy, the Christian category directly draws on Jesus’ doctrine of 
unconditional love. As Dilworth emphasizes, “[f]or Jesus, and therefore for 
Christians, love is basic, indispensable, and not to be bestowed selectively”.
16
 
This Christian concept of unconditional love necessarily conflicts with the 
classical idea of merited love. The lawyer, by allowing us to read his thoughts in a 
large number of situations that bring him in contact with Bartleby, reveals the 
sweeping and continuing effect that this conflict has on his thoughts and actions. 
 
 In the first situation in which charitable and reasonable promptings are 
shown to co-occur the lawyer remarks that a person “of a not inhumane temper … 
will endeavor charitably to construe to his imagination what proves impossible to 
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be solved by his judgment” (15). This charitable effort, however, is seamlessly 
transformed into rather calculating considerations: “Here I can cheaply purchase a 
delicious self-approval. To befriend Bartleby … will cost me little or nothing, 
while I lay up in my soul what will eventually prove a sweet morsel for my 
conscience” (15). The unchristian nature of this remark is highlighted by its – 
doubtlessly ironic – lexical allusion to a word by Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew 
(6:19-20): “Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth … but lay up for 
yourselves treasures in heaven”. Another example of a transition from compassion 
to emotional detachment prompted by reason can be found in the lawyer’s remark 
that “[t]o a sensitive being, pity is not seldom pain. And when at last it is 
perceived that such a pity cannot lead to effectual succor, common sense bids the 
soul be rid of it” (22). This kind of “prudential feeling” (22) urges the lawyer to 
retreat from a Christian, i.e. charitable, line of action.  
 
 The most explicit reference to Jesus as a beacon of charity is contained in 
one of the lawyer’s efforts to control his anger at Bartleby’s behavior: “But when 
this old Adam of resentment rose in me and tempted me concerning Bartleby, I 
grappled him and threw him. How? Why, simply by recalling the divine 
injunction: ‘A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another’” 
(30). Similarly to the example mentioned above, this initial commitment to 
Christian values is immediately supplanted by wholly self-centered, and therefore 
by definition unchristian, arguments: “Mere self-interest … should … prompt all 
beings to charity and philanthropy” (30). This example also demonstrates the 
construction throughout the story of a nexus of references to charity and the 
perversion of this principle. The mention of Adam is mirrored by the lawyer’s 
sympathetic comment that both he and his employee are “sons of Adam” (20). 
This double evocation of Adam is apt to conjure up the story of Adam’s son Cain, 
who murdered his brother Abel. This story, in turn, is alluded to in the lawyer’s 
account of “the tragedy of the unfortunate Adams and the still more unfortunate 
Colt” (30). The identity of the initials and the fact that it is the man with the initial 
C who kills the man with the initial A leave no doubt that the narrator wants 
readers to see a connection between the two stories.
17
 The purpose of this complex 
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construct is less clear. Is the lawyer praising himself for not following Cain’s 
example or is he unintentionally indicting himself by reminding the reader what 
one of the “sons of Adam” he refers to did to his brother? The lawyer’s surmise 
that it was “the circumstance of being alone in a solitary office, up stairs, of a 
building entirely unhallowed by humanizing domestic associations” (30) that 
prompted Colt to kill Adams hints at some kind of awareness that the office 
world, to which he himself belongs, is not supportive of humane feelings and 
charitableness. The surprising statement that Colt was more unfortunate than 
Adams goes in the same direction. It indicates that the lawyer is aware of the 
divine punishment that Cain received and that he understands this punishment to 
answer Cain’s question “Am I my brother’s keeper?” (Genesis 4:9) in the 
affirmative.  
 
 Towards the end of the story there is another example of this kind of 
scriptural allusion which is worth mention. After moving office, the lawyer is 
questioned on the subject of Bartleby on two occasions. Instead of accepting 
responsibility for his employee, however, he blankly denies any affiliation with 
the scrivener. Interestingly, this denial is threefold in form: His assertions “the 
man you allude to is nothing to me” and “I know nothing about him” (34) are 
followed by his remark “I persisted that Bartleby was nothing to me” (35). The 
reference to the three Petrine denials of Jesus
18
 quite intriguingly combines the 
lawyer’s internal conflict with the deliberately artificial presentation of Bartleby 
described earlier. Unlike the reference to the Colt/Adams case, however, the 
denials of Bartleby are not accompanied by any comments that would indicate 
that the lawyer is aware of the self-damaging implications of his biblical allusion. 
Yet given his repeated use of threefold structures in his description of Bartleby, it 
is unlikely that he did not intend his denials to be evocative of the betrayal of 
Jesus. The only possibility that is left is that the narrator is in fact aware of his 
self-indictment, but for some reason prefers not to expatiate upon it.
 
 
 
 The denial of Bartleby is also significant in that it denotes the decisive 
influence that social factors play in the lawyer’s final incapability to adhere to the 
                                                 
18
 Cf. Donald M. Fiene, “Bartleby the Christ”. American Transcendental Quarterly 7 (1970): 18-
23. 
22 
doctrine of Christian charitableness. The fact that the three denials of Bartleby 
occur in response to insisting demands from colleagues of the lawyer’s suggests 
that the presence of professional friends activates the reasonable fractions of the 
lawyer’s mind. Remarks such as “I believe that this wise and blessed [i.e. 
Christian] frame of mind would have continued with me had it not been for the 
unsolicited and uncharitable remarks obtruded upon me by my professional 
friends” (31) and “as … my friends continually intruded their relentless remarks 
upon the apparition in my room, a great change was wrought in me” (32) 
demonstrate that the lawyer himself is aware of the determinative influence 
exerted by his social environment. Again, the lawyer’s psychological 
configuration becomes manifest in his accounts of his interactions with other 
characters of the story. In the case of the Wall Street man’s professional friends, 
the functional nature of these interactions is quite obvious, considering the 
indistinct reference that the narrator makes to “this torrent” (35) of people. What 
is maybe less obvious is the fact that the intrusion of societal norms does not 
begin when, almost at the end of the story, that “perturbed looking stranger” (34) 
visits the lawyer. Turkey and Nippers, whom the narrator takes care to introduce 
at the beginning of his narrative and who decline in importance as the story 
proceeds, fulfill exactly the same function. When Bartleby first refuses to examine 
the copies of a legal document, the lawyer “begins … vaguely to surmise that, 
wonderful as it may be, all the justice and all the reason is on the other side” (13). 
He immediately turns to his clerks “for some reinforcement for his own faltering 
mind” (13) and is glad to find his demand confirmed. When Bartleby again 
refuses to examine copies, the lawyer’s reaction is exactly the same; he turns to 
his clerks for advice: “What do you think of it, Turkey? … What do you think of 
it, Nippers?” (16). In both cases, the narrator highlights the clerks’ functional 
nature by evoking their gradually changing moods (“Nippers’s ugly mood was on 
duty, and Turkey’s off” (14)). The decisive difference is that in his interactions 
with Turkey and Nippers the lawyer is capable of controlling the forces they 
represent and using them to his advantage. When social pressure returns in the 
form of fellow lawyers and office tenants, the lawyer is not its beneficiary, but its 
victim. He fears for his reputation – his social existence, so to say – and feels 
compelled to comply with his colleagues’ demands. 
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 Again, the degree to which the lawyer is conscious of this parallel between 
his clerks and his professional friends remains disputable. While he is certainly 
aware of the crucial influence of his colleagues on his decision to leave Bartleby, 
he makes no explicit mention of the social dimension of Turkey and Nippers. 
Uncertainties of this kind have generated a large body of critical debate 
concerning the exact nature of the lawyer’s state of mind, his sense of 
responsibility and his culpability at the end of his narrative. For a reconsideration 
of this question it may be worthwhile to take a closer look at the lawyer’s final 
encounter with Bartleby. Standing in front of the dead scrivener, the lawyer 
famously murmurs “With kings and counsellors”. That the phrase is from the 
book of Job is clear. That it is not merely a superficial or sanctimonious reference 
to the Bible becomes clear by looking at the larger context of the quotation (Job 
3). The immediate context presents some intriguing details which suggest that the 
passage was not chosen at random. Job, cursing the day of his birth, asks “why did 
I not give up the ghost when I came out of the belly?” (3:11); the lawyer stands 
before Bartleby, the “ghost”, who has just done that – given up the ghost. Job 
wishes he had died “from the womb” (3:11); the lawyer describes Bartleby lying 
on the ground in a fetal position. Job imagines his death as a kind of sleep (“I 
should have slept: then had I been at rest” (3:13)); the lawyer remarks that 
Bartleby “seemed profoundly sleeping” (40). These analogies would suggest that 
Bartleby is Job. Yet Job’s wish to rest with “princes that had gold, who filled their 
houses with silver” (3:15) is much less reminiscent of Bartleby than of the lawyer, 
who early in the story professes that he likes the name of John Jacob Astor 
because it “rings like unto bullion” (4). Taking this resemblance into account, one 
can hypothesize that the biblical reference – like so many before – is used to 
examine the lawyer’s own self. Support for this hypothesis comes from another 
reference the narrator makes to the book of Job. When the lawyer first visits 
Bartleby in prison he fancies he sees “the eyes of murderers and thieves” (38) 
peering at the scrivener. This remark is strangely damaging to the lawyer’s later 
attempt to convince Bartleby that the Tombs “is not so sad a place as one might 
think” (38). Like the oblivious Amasa Delano of “Benito Cereno”, he turns to 
nature for consolation: “Look, there is the sky, and here is the grass” (38). Unlike 
Delano, however, he seems to be aware of the questionableness of his own 
behavior. In the book of Job, it is Job himself who talks about the wicked man – 
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the “murderer” and “thief” (24:14) – who “remove[s] the landmarks” (24:2), 
“turn[s] the needy out of the way” (4) and “cause[s] the naked to lodge without 
clothing, that they have no covering in the cold” (7). Interestingly, one of his 
friends accuses Job of very similar misdeeds: “For thou hast … stripped the naked 
of their clothing. Thou hast not given water to the weary to drink, and thou hast 
withholden bread from the hungry” (22:6-8). Do these accusations not also pertain 
to the lawyer, who – apart from being involved in foreclosures – abandons his 
miserable employee although he realizes that “he eats nothing but ginger-nuts” 
(15) and although he has seen him “in his shirt sleeves, and otherwise in a 
strangely tattered dishabille” (19) and although he knows that he has nowhere to 
go? These resemblances are not the only ones; many of the topics which are 
central to Job’s story are also relevant to the lawyer and his experiences with 
Bartleby: the inanity of human existence, which unites rich and poor (3:19; 4:19-
21; 21:23-6; 34:18-20), the impossibility – even for those who believe themselves 
to be righteous – to live without sin (4:17-8; 15:16; 33:26-7) and the punishment 
of those who do not live according to God’s commandments (18:5-21; 20:4-29; 
24:18-25). If the narrator is familiar with the main tenets of the book of Job – and 
his reference to murderers and thieves suggests he is – the final words he directs 
at Bartleby indicate that he is aware of his moral deficiency as a person – he 
understands that unlike Job he is not “perfect and upright, and one that feared 
God, and eschewed evil” (1:1) – and maybe of his guilt in the particular case of 
Bartleby. It is also true, however, that the allusion to the book of Job is rather 
cautious and that the lawyer does not end his story by explicitly stating his guilt. 
 
 By way of conclusion, it has to be admitted that, after all that has been 
said, no definite judgment concerning the lawyer’s culpability can be reached. It is 
truly paradoxical that although the first-person narrator offers us extensive access 
to his thoughts we find it so difficult to either condemn or absolve him. What, 
then, is the contribution a narrator-focused approach can make to an 
understanding of “Bartleby”? The answer is that it allows us to judge the lawyer 
not only on the basis of his behavior towards Bartleby, but on the basis of his 
“narrative behavior”. From this point of view, the simple fact that the narrator is a 
first-person narrator would suggest that by allowing the lawyer to argue his own 
case Melville consciously refused to include a more clearly accusatory third-
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person voice. Similarly, the fact that the lawyer has decided to tell his story at all 
can be taken as proof that his experiences with the scrivener still haunt him. The 
lawyer’s constant oscillation between leniency and relentlessness and his 
consistent use of Christian and classical imagery suggest that he is aware of two 
different philosophic viewpoints and two options for action that are available to 
him. His final – Christian – reference to the book of Job can then be taken to be 
indicative of his abandonment of the Ciceronian viewpoint and his retrospective 
regret at not having abandoned it earlier. Yet if this final turn in the lawyer’s 
attitude is apt to win the sympathies of readers, it also presents the main problem 
that must keep readers from a plenary absolution of the lawyer, which is his lack 
of consciousness. There is a stark discrepancy between the lawyer’s extremely 
elaborate narrative, which can very sensibly be read as a pertinent and skilful self-
examination, and the lawyer’s apparent unawareness of what he is doing. There is 
simply no indication in the text that shows the lawyer to be truly conscious of the 
self-reflexive nature of his “biography”. If we assume that Melville did not simply 
chose the wrong point of view and that he takes his narrator seriously, this could 
ultimately be read as a supreme instance of irony – presenting a narrator who 
creates what may well be Melville’s most intricate piece of writing, but who does 
not understand what he is doing, and consequently falls short of a complete 
understanding and avowal of his own misdeeds. 
 
 
 
3. “Benito Cereno” – Why moralize upon it? 
 
3.1. The hostile narrator 
 
The differences between “Bartleby” and “Benito Cereno” – both in terms of topics 
and narrative technique – are numerous. The most fundamental difference, 
however, can quite succinctly be described by comparing no more than two 
aspects: the “source” of the narrative and the point of view that is used. In 
“Bartleby” the whole story is told by a first-person narrator who insists that no 
original sources are available for a verification of what he says. If it is difficult to 
judge the narrator, this is because readers entirely depend on the information that 
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he himself provides. In “Benito Cereno”, the situation is completely different. The 
narrator deliberately includes extracts of a supposedly authentic document, which 
is Benito Cereno’s deposition in the trial against the slaves of the San Dominick. 
For the rest of the story, the narrator assumes a limited point of view and relates 
the events on board the slave ship as seen through the eyes of its captain Amasa 
Delano. This narrative configuration contains the very essence of the narrator’s 
intentions in telling his story. The deposition, which the narrator purposely places 
after the main part of the narrative, seems not only to “reveal the … true history of 
the San Dominick’s voyage” (232); it is intended to devalue Delano’s 
ethnocentric point of view and attack his belief in the supremacy of the white race. 
And the reader is not spared either. During the first part of the story, he is made to 
follow Delano’s every move; he participates in his reflections and shares his 
perception of the events on board the San Dominick. Then, all of a sudden, the 
captain’s perceptions are shown to be wrong and the opposite of everything he 
assumed to be true is revealed as the real truth. Seen from this perspective, the 
limited point of view that the narrator adopts appears as the only logical choice 
because it allows him to combine the advantages of first person and third person 
narration and use them for his purposes. He comes close to a first person narrator 
in that he offers the reader the subjective experiences of one particular character 
of the story. Unlike a first person narrator, however, he is free occasionally to 
assume the role of an omniscient and intrusive narrator who comments on the 
story he tells in general and on the main character of this story in particular.  
 
 Examples of both kinds of commentary can be found at the beginning of 
the story. The third paragraph contains the well-known description of the morning 
on which the San Dominick is first sighted. As Roberta Craven rightly observes,
19
 
the paragraph introduces a threefold structure which is directly opposed to the 
binary confrontation of a black and a white race and also to the oscillation 
between confidence and distrust concerning Benito Cereno, which defines 
Delano’s behavior during his stay on the San Dominick. All three elements that 
are presented are associated with the color gray: the sea, which “was sleeked at 
the surface like waved lead” (164), the sky, which “seemed a gray surtout” (164) 
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and the “gray fowl” and “gray vapors”, which “skimmed low and fitfully over the 
waters” (164). The picture that emerges contains two solid, or “fixed” (164), 
elements – the sky and the sea – and one mobile element, which is made up of two 
components – birds and vapors. The narrator emphasizes that it is impossible to 
discern the two components of the mobile element: The birds are not only “kith 
and kin”, but also “mixed” (164) with the vapors; both birds and vapors are 
described as “gray” and “troubled” (164), and they are both referred to as “flights” 
(164). This complex image quite unambiguously problematizes the veracity of 
human perceptions, and Delano’s failure to perceive the situation on board the 
San Dominick correctly can be considered an extended illustration of this 
problem. Towards the end of the paragraph, however, the problem of perception is 
increasingly clouded. The birds are now presented as harbingers of turmoil. First 
they are “as swallows over meadows before storms” (154), then they are 
interpreted as “[s]hadows present, foreshadowing deeper shadows to come”. This 
last sentence still contains a threefold pattern consisting of two “solid” elements – 
the nouns “shadows” and “deeper shadows” – and one mobile element – the 
participle “foreshadowing” –, but the idea of grayness and indistinctness has 
disappeared. Before continuing his narrative, the narrator carefully directs the 
associations of readers away from Delano the incompetent spectator, towards 
Delano the victim of somber and fateful events that are to happen as the story 
continues.  
 
 The second instance of narrative intrusion is only one paragraph away. In 
the fourth paragraph, the narrator remarks that Delano is “a person of a singularly 
undistrustful good nature, not liable, except on extraordinary and repeated 
excitement, to indulge in personal alarms, any way involving the imputation of 
malign evil in man” (164). This sentence defines the most important aspect of the 
American captain’s character and prospectively describes his reaction towards the 
“extraordinary and repeated excitement” caused by Benito Cereno: oscillating 
between “personal alarms” concerning the Spaniard’s supposedly evil schemes 
and reassuring himself that nothing evil could ever happen to him. Immediately 
following this sentence, the narrator offers his most explicitly negative evaluation 
of the American: “Whether, in view of what humanity is capable, such a trait 
implies, along with a benevolent heart, more than ordinary quickness and 
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accuracy of intellectual perception, may be left to the wise to determine” (164). 
This sentence explicitly challenges Captain Delano’s capacity for adequate 
cognitive perception – a challenge which the following narrative will show to be 
all too well-founded. Yet the narrator takes care to word his criticism in a way that 
is apt to downplay its own importance. The use of an indirect question and a 
modal verb is complemented by the sympathetic assertion that Delano has a 
“benevolent heart”. And even the criticism of his perception is not as harsh as it 
may seem. After all, if it is not exceptional, it is still “ordinary”, and thus not 
below the level that one may reasonably expect in a human being. This 
combination of criticism and defense is typical of the narrator’s strategy. 
Formally, the sentence contains no more than a mild attack. From a narrative 
point of view, however, it is clear hat the narrator chooses to include this attack 
for the purpose of casting doubt on Delano and his ostentatious self-assuredness.  
 
 This subtly hostile strategy also pertains to the reader. It is no coincidence 
that the two most readily perceivable instances of narrator intrusion occur within 
the first four paragraphs. For the rest of the story, the reader is made to follow the 
American captain’s thoughts and actions, which inevitably causes the narrator’s 
initial remarks to be relegated to the background. While the limited point of view 
of the narrative makes it easy for readers to forget certain pieces of information 
that question the main character’s perceptual ability, the narrator does not quite let 
them off the hook. The color gray is mentioned two more times, once in 
describing the oakum-pickers, whose function on board the San Dominick Delano 
does not understand (“gray-headed bag-pipers” (168)), and once in a sentence 
which conspicuously recalls the narrator’s earlier use of the color to express the 
difficulty of accurate perception (“It was now about noon, though, from the 
grayness of everything, it seemed to be getting towards dusk” (202)). The 
adjective “leaden”, reminiscent of the “waved lead” of the third paragraph, is used 
three more times, in all cases referring to the color of the ocean. The first instance 
is particularly similar to the initial birds and vapors scene in that it combines the 
“leaden-hued swells” of the ocean and the “shreds of fog” (166) surrounding the 
Spanish ship. The second instance – “the leaden calm” (182) – is placed between 
the tolling of the forecastle bell, which is struck by one of the oakum-pickers, and 
the first appearance of the chained Atufal. Again, the grayness of the lead seems 
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to hint at Delano’s – and the reader’s – inability to understand the spectacle that is 
being staged around him, including the oakum pickers, who, unbeknownst to 
Delano, serve as a kind of police force, and Atufal, who can cast off his chains at 
any moment. The third and last use of the adjective “leaden” confirms this 
interpretation. The narrator contrasts the appearance of the “leaden ocean”, which 
“seemed laid out and leaded up” (202), and the reality that is hidden beneath this 
appearance: “But the current from landward … increased; silently sweeping her 
further and further towards the tranced waters beyond” (202). Just as the fixity of 
the leaden ocean is but an illusion, the narrator seems to be saying, so the apparent 
fixity of power relations is but a delusion which distracts the American captain 
from the “sweeping” changes that have taken place in the hierarchy of blacks and 
whites on board the Spanish vessel.  
 
 As these examples show, the narrator reverts to his initial attacks on the 
American captain’s perception several times. However, once Delano sets foot on 
the Spanish ship the number of such allusions remains quite small and there is no 
explicitly worded criticism of the kind of the “may be left to the wise to 
determine” segment. For most of the time, the narrator lets the reader go along 
with Delano and does not provide any hints that would alert him to the actual state 
of affairs on board the slave ship. Or rather, he does not provide hints that – on 
first reading the story – would suffice to alert the reader. On a second reading 
there is a huge number of discreet hints that a reader who already knows the 
outcome of the story will notice. This narrative technique creates two distinct 
reading experiences: a first reading during which the reader might suspect that 
something is going on, but still sticks with Delano as he wanders through the 
maze of the San Dominick, and a second reading during which the reader, now 
possessing an informational edge over the American, will inevitably turn on 
Delano for not realizing what is going on. Remembering his own first reading, 
however, the reader will also be forced to turn upon himself for having allowed 
the narrator to delude him. An important aspect that contributes to the success of 
this strategy is the way in which the narrator discloses not only his evaluation of 
Delano but also his fashioning of the narrative. Unlike the lawyer in “Bartleby”, 
who at the beginning of his story gives at least a slight hint that he has deliberately 
chosen a particular layout for his story, the narrator of “Benito Cereno” starts his 
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story as if it were a conventional adventure story. First, the time and place of the 
action, as well as the main character, are quickly introduced. Then, at the 
beginning of the second paragraph, the plot immediately starts off with the 
appearance of “a strange sail” (164). Evidence of a purposeful structuring of the 
narrative is withheld until the very end when, after the recapture of the San 
Dominick, the scenic mode of narration which has been used until this point is 
abandoned in favor of a panoramic mode. Now the narrator explicitly summarizes 
events, such as the voyage to Lima (231), includes supposedly authentic material, 
comments on its function in relation to the story that he has just told (“the key to 
fit into the lock of the complications which precede it” (244)) and remarks upon 
the reaction of the Lima court to Benito Cereno’s deposition. Throughout the 
deposition, the frequent omissions and summarizing remarks, which are set off 
from the original document by the use of square brackets and italic type, remind 
the reader of the narrator’s conscious manipulation of his source material. Before 
the final segment of the narrative the narrator attests to this manipulation by 
saying that “the nature of this narrative, besides rendering the intricacies in the 
beginning unavoidable, has more or less required that many things, instead of 
being set down in the order of occurrence, should be retrospectively, or irregularly 
given” (244). This claim is very similar to the lawyer’s claim that his introductory 
remarks are indispensable to an understanding of Bartleby. And as in the case of 
the lawyer, the reader wonders what exactly it is in the “nature” of the narrative 
that requires a departure from a strictly chronological account of the events on 
board the San Dominick. After all, what objective reason is there for the narrator 
not to bear out the “straight adventure story” promise of his initial paragraphs and 
simply tell the story from beginning to end? The answer can only be that the 
narrator uses the structure of “Benito Cereno” to condemn Delano for his racially 
biased blindness and the reader for his inadvertent complicity.  
 
 
3.2. The deposition and the narrative – “the key to fit into the lock”? 
 
On the basis of the assumption developed in the preceding chapter, it would seem 
that a more detailed idea of the narrator’s efforts to damage the American captain 
can be developed by identifying elements that occur in the deposition and in the 
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preceding narrative, analyzing the different ways in which they are used in the 
two parts of the story and determining the effect that these differences have on the 
reader’s evaluation of Captain Delano. A comparable procedure can be applied to 
elements that play an important role in one part of the narrative, but are absent in 
the other part.  
 
 The first and most important element concerns the different groups of 
slaves and the role they play in the rebellion on board the San Dominick. At the 
beginning of the deposition (233), the narrator takes care to include those slaves in 
his list whose role is elaborated upon in the rest of the deposition and in the 
narrative itself: Francesco, the oakum-pickers, the hatchet-polishers, Atufal, Babo 
and the women with their children. All other slaves, except for José and Dago, are 
omitted. The narrator is also very careful to include pieces of information about 
the slaves that highlight Delano’s inability to see reality. Concerning Francesco, 
for example, we learn that he is “of a good … voice, having sung in the 
Valparaiso churches” (233). This reminds us of Delano’s remark, “What a 
pleasant voice he has, too?” (215). Later in the deposition we learn that “the 
mulatto steward, Francesco, was of the first band of revolters” (241) and that he 
intended to poison Captain Delano’s food. The American is far from surmising as 
much because he is deceived by the steward’s exterior appearance. From the 
mulatto’s fancy dress (“a pagoda turban”), his complexion and features (“the 
complexion of the mulatto was hybrid, his physiognomy was European” (214)) 
and his submissive gestures Delano deduces that he must needs be “the king of 
kind hearts and polite fellows” (215). Delano also sees the mulatto as proof that 
the intermixture of “white” blood in African blood improves the latter’s quality 
(215). He is so obsessed with his idea of white superiority that he even assumes 
Babo, the “purebred” African, to feel inferior to Francesco (“his jealous 
watchfulness … which the full-blooded African entertains for the adulterated one” 
(214)). A very similar pattern applies to the oakum-pickers and hatchet polishers. 
The deposition tells us that “Babo appointed the four aged Negroes … to keep 
what domestic order they could on the decks” and that “he stationed [the 
Ashantees] on the break of the poop, as if to clean certain hatchets … but in 
reality to use them, and distribute them … at a given word he told them” (238). 
While Delano does realize that the old slaves’ role is to maintain some order on 
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board the ship, the words he uses to refer to them show that he has no idea that 
they are part of an elaborate scheme that serves to delude him. To Delano, the 
oakum-pickers are either “old dominies” (180), “bed-ridden old knitting women” 
(192) or “gray-headed bag-pipers” (168). All terms betray the captain’s tendency 
to seek a familiar image from his own experience and cultural background that 
can be obtruded on the black slaves and their activities. In the case of the hatchet-
polishers, this tendency is even more pronounced. Delano compares them to 
“scullion[s]” (169), “organ-grinders” (179), “tailors” (204) and “scissors-
grinders” (191). Even his less domestic designations – “conjurors” (181) and 
“black wizards” (189) – do not seem to convey a genuine sense of fear or 
apprehension.  
 
 Interestingly, Delano’s use of familiarizing metaphors is not restricted to 
his references to the oakum-pickers and hatchet-polishers. In fact, it is one of the 
features that is most characteristic of the American’s reflections throughout the 
narrative. The origin of Delano’s obsessive and continual “familiarizing” can be 
identified by looking at the passages in which the word “familiar” – or other 
words from the same word family – is used. A comparison of the most important 
examples clearly indicates that the American captain “imports” his need for a 
familiar environment from his own ship (“the quiet orderliness of the sealer’s 
comfortable family of a crew” (173)) to the mysterious Spanish ship, where – so 
he thinks – the relation between blacks and whites is indicative of a certain 
“familiarity” (171, 184, 185, 209). The metaphors Delano uses are but a logical 
consequence and elaboration of this basic misconception. They refer to the San 
Dominick (“some eccentric bachelor-squire in the country” (207)), Babo’s 
supposed concern for his master (“smoothing the hair along the temples as a nurse 
does a child’s” (218)), the Spanish sailors (“reconnoitering from a port-hole like a 
fox from the mouth of its den” (198)) and the other black slaves (“a social circle 
of bats” (205), “a slumbering negress … like a doe in the shade of a woodland 
rock” (196)). What is interesting about these metaphors is that in many cases they 
combine an effort to create a harmless, familiar scene with the use of animal 
imagery. They also show that this combination is not peculiar to Delano’s 
conception of blacks, but that it is characteristic of his perception of the exterior 
world in general, which relies on the application of preconceived patterns to 
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unfamiliar or inexplicable phenomena. In the case of the blacks, however, the 
particularly frequent use of animal images indicates that his belief in the 
anthropological inferiority of blacks also plays an important role. It is probably an 
indefinite blend of both factors that leads Delano to his assumption that the black 
slaves of the San Dominick are “too stupid” (199) to design a plot against him. 
This basic assumption, which informs all of Delano’s misconceptions of the 
events on board the San Dominick, is exploited by Babo, who conceives devices 
which speak to Delano’s racial bias and his need for “familiarity”. 
 
 The most prominent device of his kind – in addition to the oakum-pickers 
and the hatchet-polishers – is the staging of the chained Atufal’s plea for Benito 
Cereno’s mercy. It never occurs to Delano that, as the deposition tells us, “in a 
moment the chains could be dropped” (238). He is successfully lulled into the 
belief that Captain Cereno’s command of the ship has remained uninfringed. The 
sense of Delano’s delusion is aggravated by his own words, which hint at the truth 
that he himself does not perceive. He humorously urges the Spanish captain to 
“take a fool’s advice” (184) and remit Atufal’s penalty. He also thinks he divines 
the meaning behind the padlock of Atufal’s chains and the key around Cereno’s 
neck: “So, Don Benito – padlock and key – significant symbols, truly” (184). Yet 
both utterances only highlight the fact that Delano is indeed a “fool” and that he 
does not understand the symbolic nature of the chained Atufal figure. 
 
 The success of such devices as Atufal’s fake chains depends on their 
careful planning by Babo, the “plotter” of the slaves’ revolt (241). Delano’s 
perception of the black, which is of course wholly incongruous with reality, 
confirms the American’s proneness to the deceptions of exterior appearance. 
When “in quest of whomsoever it might be that commanded the ship” (169) he 
first sees the captain and his supposed slave, he is confronted with two figures 
who display a marked contrast in physical appearance. While Delano is “dressed 
with singular richness”, Babo is “of small stature” and has a “rude face” (169). 
This contrast is even more evident in a later scene (177) where the American’s 
“loose Chili jacket of dark velvet”, his “high-crowned sombrero” and “slender 
sword, silver mounted” are described at length and contrasted with Babo’s “wide 
trowsers … made out of some old topsail”. As the narrator explicitly tells us, it is 
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“the contrast in dress, denoting their relative positions” that confirms the 
American’s initial conception of the master-slave relation between Cereno and 
Babo. The American captain’s spontaneous admiration of “the beauty of that 
relationship” is due to his racially conditioned mind, which automatically 
associates blacks with the servant role and whites with the master role. Because of 
his racial bias Delano finds a hierarchical relationship “beautiful” which, if the 
power relation were to be reversed, he would most certainly find repelling.
20
 The 
narrator rather subtly hints at this arbitrary and biased distribution of roles. If his 
sentence “As master and man stood before him, the black upholding the white …” 
is taken to be a parallel construction, it associates “master” with “black” and 
“man” with “white”. If it is a chiasmus, it highlights the artificial assignment of 
superiority and inferiority in the power relation between blacks and whites. In 
addition to this structural point, the choice of the word “man” breaks up the 
conventional opposition of master and slave and underlines that no matter who is 
identified as the “master”, both Babo and Cereno are “men”, i.e. human beings. A 
less subtle hint at the arbitrary and changing distribution of roles can be found in 
the description of the San Dominick’s stern-piece, which is one of the elements 
that do not figure in the deposition and that the narrator thus seems to have added 
to the narrative on his own accord. As in previous cases, the word “device” is 
used to alert readers to the hidden meaning of the “symbolical devices” that are 
presented. And as in the chained Atufal scene there is no indication that Delano 
understands the purport of what is before his eyes. What the narrator – and 
Melville – wants readers to understand from the stern-piece device has very 
convincingly been shown by Daniel Göske, who argues that the inspiration for the 
“dark satyr in a mask, holding his foot on the prostrate neck of a writhing figure, 
likewise masked” (167) comes from Anna Jameson’s description of Raphael’s 
painting “St. Michael and the Dragon”.
21
 This painting illustrates the traditional 
theme of the fiendish satyr thrust down by an angel of God. While the stern-piece 
thus reverses the traditional power relation between good and evil, it also insists 
that the epithets “good” and “evil” cannot permanently be attached to either party. 
Even if we take the “dark satyr” to stand for the black “race”, the fact remains that 
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the narrator takes care to emphasize that both figures are alike in that they wear 
masks. These masks seem to be another device that the narrator uses in order to 
show that moral categories are not essential to particular groups of people, but that 
they can, and indeed often have been, put on and off by any part of mankind that 
one cares to name. This quite far-reaching interpretation is supported by the 
narrator’s explicit reversal of roles in the scene in which Delano prevents Babo 
from stabbing his master. By using two of the words that are central to the 
description of the stern-piece – “prostrate” and “writhe up” – the narrator makes it 
clear that it is now Delano who plays the part of the “dark satyr”. His foot is 
shown to “ground the prostrate negro”, who, on his part, is “snakishly writhing up 
from the boat’s bottom” (227).  
 
 This interchangeability of roles ultimately suggests that there are no 
inherent differences between members of the human species. The narrator seems 
to encourage readers to adopt this view by emphasizing one detail of the 
deposition which otherwise would not command much attention. The deposition 
tells us that “on the fifth day of the calm, all on board suffering much from the 
heat, and want of water, and five having died in fits, and mad, the negroes became 
irritable” (237). This sentence underlines the common experience of suffering on 
board the ship and remains strangely ambiguous about whether the men who died 
were white or black. This idea of community in suffering is very conspicuously 
foregrounded by the narrator in the scene in which Captain Delano enters the 
Spanish slave ship: “Climbing the side, the visitor was at once surrounded by a 
clamorous throng of whites and blacks … But, in one language, and as with one 
voice, all poured out a common tale of suffering” (167). Following this 
description, which emphasizes the oneness of blacks and whites, an extended 
series of third person pronouns – “they” and “their” are used six times – continues 
the idea of the common and unifying experience of human frailty. As the story 
proceeds, the narrator includes several scenes in which black slaves and white 
sailors are shown to be engaged in a common task. The first such scene includes a 
“sailor seated on the deck engaged in tarring the strap of a large block” (194). He 
is surrounded by blacks, one of whom holds his tar pot. What is interesting about 
this scene is that the white sailor blackens his hand in the process of tarring, which 
makes him more like the blacks around him. Delano’s moralizing remarks (“… 
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that man there has fouled his hand in [wickedness]” (195)) must thus be taken to 
refer to blacks and whites alike. This idea of a common entanglement of blacks 
and whites in immorality is even more obvious in a later scene (199) which 
features a sailor whose “hands were full of ropes, which he was working into a 
large knot”. Again, whites and blacks share in the task that is described: “Some 
blacks were about him obligingly dipping the strands for him”. As in previous 
scenes, the narrator indicates that Delano comes very close to understanding the 
meaning of the scene, but in the end remains ignorant. To him the knotter “looked 
like an Egyptian priest, making Gordian knots for the temple of Ammon”. The 
evocation of the Gordian knot clearly serves to highlight the intricacy of the 
sailor’s knot, but it also refers to the “Alexandrian solution”, i.e. the use of force 
to undo the knot. Interestingly, this is exactly what the sailor who makes the knot 
urges Delano to do: “Undo it, cut it, quick” (200). If we apply this extended 
allusion to the relation between whites and blacks on the San Dominick it seems 
to suggest that they are so tightly “knotted together” by their common humanity 
that only the use of force can separate them into different groups and arbitrarily 
assign an inferior, or even “evil”, role to one of them. 
 
 All the elements that have just been cited clearly show that the narrator 
provides the reader with a sufficient number of cues to allow him to understand – 
at least on a second reading – that the “Benito Cereno” narrative refutes the idea 
of the inferiority of the black “race”, which is so obvious to Delano, and also 
disproves the supposed viciousness of the black slaves, which some critics have 
taken for granted.
22
 It is also true, however, that the narrator’s commitment to the 
refusal of these ideas is not always equally apparent. One scene which has been 
cited as proof that the narrator shares Delano’s racism presents blacks as “natural 
valets and hair-dressers” and praises their “docility arising from the unaspiring 
contentment of a limited mind” (209). Although there is no clear sign that this 
view is only the narrator’s rendering of Delano’s racial bias, there are some 
indications that the narrator is distancing himself from his focalizer-protagonist. 
First of all, the narrator’s remarks are part of a scene that shows Delano “looking 
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round” (208) the cuddy of the San Dominick. Hence, it can be argued that it is the 
American’s impression of everything he sees that the narrator reports to the 
reader. The narrator seems to confirm this interpretation of his role by ending his 
supposedly racist remarks with a description of the clearly racist Delano, who 
“took to Negroes … genially, just as other men to Newfoundland dogs” (209). 
The focus on Delano is maintained by the remark that “all his old weakness for 
negroes returned” (209), which suggests that the views expressed earlier are a 
reflection of the American’s thoughts, but not the narrator’s. The statement about 
Delano’s peculiar “weakness” for the black “race” also reminds us that the 
narrator’s remarks about the nature of this “race” are made at the beginning of the 
shaving scene, which is a supreme example of Babo’s mental capacities and the 
way he uses them to outwit the supposedly superior American. The narrator is 
necessarily aware of this fact, but chooses to delay the revelation of Babo’s 
scheming in order to restrict the reader’s insight to the perceptive horizon of 
captain Delano. In the context of this general narrative tactic, which serves to 
extend the critique of Delano to the reader, the narrator’s apparently racist 
remarks can only be taken to mirror the American captain’s undoubtedly racist 
thinking. A hint of a more formal nature which confirms this view comes from the 
conditional clause “But if there be that in the negro which exempts him from the 
inflicted sourness of the morbid or cynical mind …” (209), which calls into 
question the accuracy of the condition that it expresses.  
 That the narrator’s own stance is really more unbiased than Delano’s 
becomes clear as soon as his presence is physically removed from the American 
captain. Throughout the first part of the narrative, the narrator follows Delano 
very closely. At the end of the first segment, however, the narrator abandons 
Delano and follows the chief mate of the Bachelor’s Delight in his attempt to 
recapture the San Dominick. This passage, unlike the previous ones, is defined by 
a striking symmetry in the description of blacks and whites. The shots of the 
whites’ “muskets” are answered by the blacks’ “yells”; at the “second volley” of 
the whites the blacks “hurtled their hatchets”, one of them “remaining stuck in the 
gunwale”. The hatchet is returned and “now stuck in the ship’s broken quarter-
gallery” (229). A similarly symmetric arrangement is found in the sentence 
“Sealing-spears and cutlasses crossed hatchets and hand-spikes” (230), in which 
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the narrator explicitly evokes a chiasmus-like form by the use of the verb “cross”. 
When the white sailors finally take the ship, they are described as “submerged 
sword-fish rushing … through shoals of black-fish” (231). It is interesting that in 
this crucial moment the narrator, who is now independent of Delano, uses animal 
imagery to refer to both blacks and whites. Somewhat less obviously, the same 
phenomenon is observable in the description of the defeated blacks (“Their red 
tongues lolled, wolf-like, from their black mouths” (231)), which is immediately 
followed by a similar description of the sailors (“But the pale sailors’ teeth were 
set” (231)). The deposition, which like the final part of the narrative is detached 
from Delano’s biased point of view, adds two more scenes that highlight the basic 
sameness of blacks and whites. The first one shows a white sailor “who, having 
found a razor in the pocket of an old jacket of his, which one of the shackled 
negroes had on, was aiming it at the negro’s throat”. In the second scene, Delano 
takes from “Bartholomew Barlo a dagger, secreted at the time of the massacre of 
the whites, with which he was in the act of stabbing a shackled negro, who, the 
same day, with another negro, had thrown him down and jumped upon him” 
(243). Both examples emphasize the constant to-and-fro between superiority and 
inferiority of blacks and whites. They also show that in essence black slaves and 
white sailors are driven by the same impulse. Once they have gained control over 
their former masters, they take revenge and become guilty of the same atrocities 
that they suffered from when their opponents were in control. 
 
 Concluding this chapter, one formal aspect which underlines the falseness 
of Captain Delano’s biased view deserves closer consideration. In the deposition, 
the use of indirect speech – and the concomitantly high frequency of the 
subordinator “that” – constantly reminds readers that they are presented with a 
subjective account that does not come from the narrator himself. A comparable 
mechanism is used in the preceding narrative, where the narrator uses an abundant 
number of “like” and “as if” constructions. They are so numerous that it would be 
impossible to cite all of them. Suffice it to say that they are always used to 
describe Delano’s perception of the San Dominick, its captain and the black 
slaves and that they always serve to illustrate the American’s misconceptions. A 
very obvious example is Delano’s impression that Babo follows his master and 
keeps “his eye fixed on his face, as if to watch for the first sign of complete 
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restoration” (175). The American’s “as if” interpretation is later corrected by the 
deposition, which tells us that what is behind this “appearance of submission is 
Babo’s intention to “observe the deponent’s actions and words” (239). 
Interestingly, the deposition is not only the corrective of Delano’s as-ifs, it also 
seems to be their source. The narrator apparently imitates expressions he finds in 
the deposition, such as “them he stationed on the break of the poop, as if to clean 
certain hatchets” (238), and uses them in his narrative to attack the American’s – 
and the reader’s – inability to understand that what he sees is but a distorted 
version of reality. The only section in which the narrator uses no such qualifying 
narrative constructions is the final segment following the deposition. It is no 
coincidence, therefore, that this segment contains the most overt criticism of 
Captain Delano and his ignorant mindset. While the Spanish captain has been 
deeply affected by the events he was forced to witness on his own ship, Captain 
Delano prefers to forget everything that has happened: “But the past is passed; 
why moralize upon it? Forget it. See, yon bright sun has forgotten it all, and the 
blue sea, and the blue sky” (246). Benito Cereno, who accuses his American 
colleague of his blindness, understands very well that Delano has not been 
affected at all by what has happened. The American’s advice to forget everything 
and his unwillingness to consider possible moral consequences of the events he 
has been involved in leave no doubt that his blindness and ignorance remain 
undiminished at the end of the narrative. In this context, the importance of the 
Spaniard’s reply “Because they have no memory … because they are not human” 
(246) cannot be underestimated. By including this conversation, which is only one 
among many, supposedly “cordial”, conversations, the narrator not only shows 
that his focalizer-protagonist remains in a state of willful blindness, but also 
makes the point that by doing so he reveals his “unhuman” nature. There is a 
particularly damaging irony in this message, of course, considering that 
throughout the narrative it is Delano who denies the blacks the status of human 
beings. 
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3.3. Christian (and classical) imagery  
 
While the narrative organization of “Benito Cereno” clearly condemns Captain 
Delano’s racial bias, the imagery that the narrator uses equally clearly condemns 
the institution of slavery, which is the natural result of racism. Since in “Benito 
Cereno” it is the Spanish ship that carries the slaves, the criticism contained in the 
story’s metaphors is exclusively leveled at the Spanish Empire, complementing, 
as it were, the criticism of the United States that is inherent in the narrator’s 
portrayal of the American captain. This complementary function is most obvious 
in the careful selection of the metaphors that are used. Unlike his “colleagues” in 
“Bartleby” and Billy Budd, the narrator of “Benito Cereno” does not use any 
metaphors from the domain of Greco-Roman antiquity. The only metaphors that 
could be counted as “classical” have an explicitly “Egyptian” character: the 
“sphynx-like” oakum-pickers (168), the knotter who looks like “an Egyptian 
priest” (199), Atufal, the “bull of the Nile” (203), who looks “like one of those 
sculptured porters of black marble guarding the porches of Egyptian tombs” 
(218), and of course Babo, who “seemed a Nubian sculptor” (213). What all these 
examples have in common is that they reflect the American’s perception of the 
black slaves he sees on board the San Dominick. As Allan M. Emery
23
 has 
pointed out, the reference to Egypt – and to Nubia in particular – is evocative of a 
debate about the original unity of the human race which was raging at the time of 
the publication of “Benito Cereno”. Emery mentions Josiah Nott’s and George 
Gliddon’s Types of Mankind, which made use of archeological “evidence” from 
Egypt in order to confirm the supposedly natural separation of races. Emery also 
notes, however, that other publications that appeared during the 1840s and 1850s 
contested Nott’s and Gliddon’s conclusions, insisting instead on the unity of races 
and their common origin in Adam. Given the narrative configuration of “Benito 
Cereno”, Emery is certainly right in concluding that Melville did not side with the 
separateness of races fraction. It is very likely, therefore, that the narrator of his 
story uses the Egyptian imagery in an effort to denounce Delano’s racist ideas 
about the existence of a black “species”, which are most obviously evinced in his 
reflections on Cereno’s being “so far a renegade as to apostatize from his very 
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species” (199). The narrator presents Delano’s perceptions not because they are in 
accord with his own beliefs, but because he uses them to turn against the 
American – and readers who fail to realize that Delano’s conception of what he 
sees is not to be accepted as the incontestable truth. 
 
 In addition to the restricted number of classical images, the narrator uses a 
certain number of explicitly Christian metaphors, which, even more clearly than 
the allusions just mentioned, refer to historical events and personages. As many 
scholars have noted, the selection of these references is such that they 
complement each other and form a complex representation of the role that the 
Christian Church played in the establishment of the slave trade in the Americas.
24
 
The most important element in this complex metaphor is the Spanish slave ship, 
the San Dominick. The ship’s name, which is one of the narrator’s most obvious 
modifications of his source document, is a straightforward allusion to the island of 
Santo Domingo, which was discovered by Columbus – the San Dominick’s 
original figurehead (236) – and soon became one of the first centers of the 
importation of slaves in the New World. The Catholic Church – and the monastic 
order of the Dominicans in particular – played an important role in the 
propagation of the large-scale exportation of African slaves into the New World. 
The Spanish crown, on the other hand, was not unresponsive to the idea of 
replacing the increasingly diminished indigenous population of its overseas 
colonies with imported black slaves. Two of the most notable figures in this 
enterprise were Charles the Fifth of Spain and Bartholomew de Las Casas, a 
Dominican priest who apparently convinced the Spanish king to legalize the 
exportation of slaves to Santo Domingo. It is certainly no coincidence that the 
narrator chooses to include references to both the worldly and the clerical 
champion of slavery in his narrative. Not only does the San Dominick look “like a 
white-washed monastery”, it also contains “a ship-load of monks”, “throngs of 
dark cowls” and “other dark moving figures … as of Black Friars pacing the 
cloisters” (166). This explicit reference to the Dominicans – “Black Friar” being a 
conventional synonym of “Dominican” – is in line with Delano’s perception that 
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Captain Cereno, who is the apparent leader of the friars, resembles Charles the 
Fifth of Spain (172). The Spanish king’s advisor Las Casas is also referred to in 
the story. Towards the end of the deposition, we are told that the name of one of 
the sailors who took revenge on the black slaves after the conquest of the San 
Dominick is Bartholomew Barlo (243). In the final segment of the story, which is 
detached from Delano’s point of view, the narrator explains that the remains of 
the killed slaveholder Aranda were buried in “St. Bartholomew’s church” (247).  
 
 These explicit references to actual historical events add a sense of realism 
to the narrative and oppose Delano’s naïve racism by evoking the horrors of slave 
trade and slavery as they existed in the New World. As in many other cases, 
Delano does not seem to be aware of what his own impressions of the San 
Dominick imply. There is no sign that his evaluation of slavery is in any way in 
concord with the historically-informed opinion that seems to be the narrator’s. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that some of the details that very clearly condemn the 
Spanish are provided in parts of the story that show the narrator to be detached 
from Delano’s viewpoint. This includes not only the name “Bartholomew”, but 
also the information that at the trial in Lima Benito Cereno was supported by a 
monk called Infelez (232) and later retired to a monastery on Mount Agonia (244, 
247). Both names can be read as the narrator’s way of commenting on the 
miserable end that is allotted to a man who has chosen to become engaged in the 
machinations of the Spanish crown and the Spanish Church. Even more 
condemning than the Spanish telling names is one biblical allusion which appears 
in the description of the San Dominick. The first part of the relevant paragraph 
contains a clear hint at Delano’s role as focalizer (“As the whale-boat drew more 
and more nigh …” (166)). At the end of the paragraph, however, the limited point 
of view (“Her keel seemed laid” (166; my emphasis)) is abandoned in favor of a 
rather unmediated remark which must be taken to come directly from the narrator: 
“she launched, from Ezekiel’s Valley of Dry Bones” (166; my emphasis). As 
Mario L. D’Avanzo
25
 has observed, this allusion to Ezekiel 37 presents the San 
Dominick as the symbol of a morally corrupt society. One of the pervading topics 
of Ezekiel is indeed the sinfulness of God’s chosen people and its subsequent 
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punishment. A very poignant example of this motive is the abomination of 
Jerusalem, the “bloody city” in Ezekiel 22. Interestingly, Ezekiel 37, which is the 
chapter that the narrator refers to, does not describe the punishment of Israel but 
the revivification of its dry bones through God. In “Benito Cereno”, this spiritual 
revival is clearly lacking, given the final scene of the narrative, which shows the 
decapitated slave Babo interlocked in a triangle of gazes with the slaveholder 
Aranda, whose bones rest in St. Bartholomew’s church, and the slave trader 
Cereno, whose dead body lies in a monastery on Mount Agonia. The hopelessness 
of this ending is in contrast to the divine attribution of new life and new hope in 
Ezekiel. What makes this contrast even more fascinating is the fact that in a 
passage which immediately follows the quotation in the story – 37:15-19 – God 
reunifies Judah and Israel to create a single nation: “Behold, I will take the stick 
of Joseph, which is in the hand of Ephraim, and the tribes of Israel his fellows, 
and will put them with him, even with the stick of Judah, and make them one 
stick, and they shall be one in mine hand” (37:19). Despite the obvious 
differences in historical context, it is tempting to suppose that the narrator uses the 
immediate textual context of his quotation to substantiate his tacit claim that 
things – or groups of people – that on the surface appear to be separate are in fact 
meant to be unified. 
 
 Apart from the allusion to Ezekiel, there is only one further instance of 
an explicitly Christian reference in Benito Cereno – the use of words from the 
word family “charity”. In “Bartleby”, the oscillation of the lawyer between a 
“charitable prompting” and more self-interested impulses is crucial to the moral 
evaluation of his behavior. The use of classical and Christian references serves to 
denominate and exteriorize the opposing philosophical viewpoints that are 
involved in the lawyer’s internal conflict. The plot of “Benito Cereno” seems to 
be defined by a very similar pattern in that Captain Delano is unable to decide on 
an appropriate response to Benito Cereno’s puzzling behavior. Is he a miserable 
and somewhat eccentric “charity case” that deserves pity and support or is he a 
shrewd pirate preying on his unsuspecting victim? Like the lawyer, the American 
captain does not come to a definite answer and does not take any direct action 
against his unaccountable opposite. Apparent as these similarities may be, they 
should not be allowed to conceal the fundamental differences between the 
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lawyer’s and Delano’s situation. Unlike the lawyer, Delano is not in a position to 
act on anybody. Nothing depends on the outcome of his oscillating because the 
black slaves control the situation on the ship from beginning to end. In fact, 
Delano’s oscillation is completely pointless because the alternative viewpoints 
that are involved in it are both wrong. Captain Cereno is neither an eccentric 
aristocrat, who is simply worn out by disease and want of water, nor a pirate 
hiding his murderous designs. Delano does not have the slightest idea of the moral 
import of his situation because his racist bias does not allow him to identify the 
only dichotomy that is really relevant on the San Dominick, which is the reversed 
power relation between black slaves and white masters. Interestingly, the 
narrator’s use of the Christian word “charity” underlines the incompleteness of 
Delano’s vision and the wrongheadedness of his refusal to examine his own 
notions of good and evil. The first time the word is used it refers to captain 
Cereno’s “sour and gloomy disdain”, which “the American in charity ascribed to 
the harassing effects of sickness” (171). While the falseness of this impression can 
only be deduced from the information given in the deposition, the absurdity of 
Delano’s second charity-inspired reaction – his disdain of a white sailor with a 
haggard face – is denounced quite openly. First, the narrator tells us that the 
sailor’s haggardness has nothing to do with his character. Then he adds: “Not that 
this reflection occurred to Captain Delano at the time, charitable man as he was” 
(194). The idea that does occur to Delano is that the sailor’s moral constitution 
can be deduced from his outer appearance. As both examples show, the narrator’s 
reference to the concept of charity is part of his overarching intention to denounce 
Delano’s superficial and self-centered outlook on life. There is no opposition of 
charity and classical philosophy and no description of an individual caught 
between conflicting moral and social imperatives. The one element that is used to 
extend the concept of charity is Delano’s famous “good-nature”. In the 
conversation between the captains of the San Dominick and the Bachelor’s 
Delight, Delano contends that “the sight of so much suffering [on the San 
Dominick] … added to my good-nature, compassion, and charity, happily 
interweaving the three” (245). Although this remark shows Captain Delano to be 
somewhat ashamed of his utter cluelessness during his stay on the Spanish ship, it 
is rather self-congratulatory and self-pitying in tone. The American mentions his 
charity in the same breath as his good-nature and there is no doubt that he 
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considers both qualities to be intimately related. By establishing this close 
relation, Captain Delano, quite despite himself, calls to mind the critique of good-
naturedness which the narrator presents to the reader in the “in view of what 
humanity is capable” remark in the first part of the story. This critique is borne out 
by the way in which the narrator describes the scenes that show Delano’s good-
nature in operation. Most importantly, it is always presented as a reaction to 
suspicions that obtrude on the American’s mind from the outside: “From no train 
of thought did these fancies come; not from within, but from without” (186). It is 
also important to note that the good-natured reaction to these suspicions is 
described not as an unconscious process, but rather as the result of a deliberate 
mental effort: “… exerting his good-nature to the utmost, insensibly he came to a 
compromise” (202). The conclusion that can be drawn from this mode of 
presentation is that the narrator wants readers to understand that Delano is not so 
much involved in a process of coming to terms with a morally challenging 
situation, as is arguably the case with the lawyer of “Bartleby”, but that he is 
trying hard to ignore those aspects of reality that are apt to shatter his self-
centered outlook on life.
26
 This reading is confirmed by the narrator’s remark that 
“credulous good-nature had been too ready to furnish excuses for reasonable 
fears” (223), which means that Captain Delano is being unreasonable in trying to 
explain away anything that does not fit his worldview. The narrator further 
emphasizes Delano’s unreasonableness by juxtaposing references to his good-
nature and rather extensive passages of free indirect speech that details Delano’s 
misled assumptions about Cereno. The reference to reasonable fears is followed 
by one such passage, which culminates in the question “What imported all those 
day-long enigmas and contradictions, except they were intended to mystify, 
preliminary to some stealthy blow?” (223). Delano’s good-nature “regaining its 
meridian” is preceded by a similar passage, which circles around the idea that 
“under the aspect of infantile weakness, the most savage energies might be 
couched” (186). Shortly before the narrator’s remark bout Delano’s “explaining 
away” (192) anything that might unsettle him, the American wonders whether 
“the San Dominick [might], like a slumbering volcano, suddenly let loose 
energies now hid?” (191). Finally, before “exerting his good-nature to the 
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utmost”, Delano chides himself for suspecting Cereno of murderous designs: 
“What a donkey I was” (201). The effect of presenting Delano’s erroneous 
believes at such great length is quite clear. It adds to the impression that the 
American captain is completely unaware of the perceptual and moral challenges 
that the San Dominick and her crew represent. As in many previous examples, the 
narrator tries to implicate the reader in this state of unawareness. He spends a 
considerable amount of narrative time on the description of Delano’s continual to-
and-fro between suspicion and assurance – only to reveal at he end of the story 
that this oscillation is entirely meaningless. At the same time he includes a 
sufficient number of hints for readers to realize, on a second reading, that they 
should have noticed them much earlier. The message of the narrator seems to be 
that the only person on board the Spanish slave ship that is demonstrably “too 
stupid” to understand the meaning of the San Dominick episode is the American 
captain – and, on the meta-level of the “Benito Cereno” narrative, the reader who 
willingly follows the “charitable” American’s example. 
 
 As the examination of Delano’s charity and good-nature has shown, the 
narrator’s use of Christian elements leads us back to the all-important issue of 
perception and awareness. Indeed, it is one of the defining characteristics of 
“Benito Cereno” that all the Christian elements of the story – the allusion to the 
introduction of slavery on Santo Domingo, the citation from Ezekiel and the 
mention of Delano’s charity – serve the purpose of strengthening the narrator’s 
case against Delano’s racism and willful blindness. The sparse examples of 
classical images do nothing to attenuate the narrator’s attack; they criticize the 
American’s belief in the inferiority of the black “race” and expose his 
unawareness that it is he who is in the inferior position. As a result of this 
congruity between the narrative configuration of the story and the use of Christian 
imagery and vocabulary it is much easier to pass a final verdict on Delano than it 
is to do the same for the lawyer or Captain Vere. Both in “Bartleby” and in Billy 
Budd the narrative configuration and the imagery that the narrator uses create a 
sense of complexity and ambiguity. In “Benito Cereno”, despite the elaborateness 
of the narrative structure and the imagery that is used, the meaning of both 
elements comes down to one simple thing that the narrator wants readers to 
understand: “Captain Amasa Delano, of Duxbury, in Massachusetts” (164) has a 
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bad character. He is racist and self-loving; he judges others, but never questions 
himself; he believes in his superiority without being aware of his own intellectual 
inferiority; even his charity is no more than a function of his desire to contain 
forces that challenge his complacent worldview. It is this unequivocal indictment 
of its main character which sharply sets off “Benito Cereno” from both “Bartleby” 
and Billy Budd.  
 
 
 
4. Billy Budd – Truth uncompromisingly told? 
 
4.1. The ambiguous narrator 
 
Looking at the narrative configuration of Billy Budd in comparison with 
“Bartleby” and “Benito Cereno”, one significant difference becomes clear 
immediately. While in the Putnam’s stories the narrator’s view is for the most part 
limited to the information that is available to the non-title character of the story, 
the narrator of Billy Budd is invested with a genuinely omniscient point of view 
that allows him not only to move around in time and space but also to comment 
freely on all the characters of the story. At first sight, this difference may not seem 
to deserve much attention. After all, the general layout of Melville’s final piece of 
writing does not differ drastically from that of his earlier novellas. In all three 
works there is a main part which offers a chronological account of the events that 
befall the non-title character in his dealings with the title character. This part, 
which ends with the death – or, in the case of Cereno, the hospitalization – of the 
title character, is followed by a kind of supplement which contains information 
that seems to be important for a balanced evaluation of the non-title character. In 
the case of “Bartleby”, this is the Dead Letter Office rumor, in “Benito Cereno”, 
the conversation between Delano and Cereno on their way to Lima, and in Billy 
Budd, the Athée episode which includes Captain Vere’s death. “Benito Cereno” 
and Billy Budd also contain a supposedly authentic document – the Lima court 
deposition and the naval chronicle report – from which the narrator quotes 
verbatim. In Billy Budd the narrator goes even one step further by including yet 
another document: the “Billy in the Darbies” poem about the foretopman’s 
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execution. Seen from this perspective, Billy Budd seems to be little more than the 
continuation of a narrative practice that is firmly established in the Melville short 
prose canon: adding layers of meaning to an already polysemous narrative by 
appending segments of text that refer back to problematic or ambiguous elements 
of the main part of the story. Does Billy Budd really possess a narrative strategy of 
its own, or is it merely an example of the mastery that, close to the end of his life, 
Melville had acquired in chiseling his words and fine-tuning the components of 
his narrative technique? 
 
 For a first step towards answering this question, let us consider the 
information that is more or less openly available in the text. Like the Putnam’s 
stories, Billy Budd contains moments of narrative intrusion, which serve to 
highlight the presence of the narrator and allow him to comment on the process of 
composing a piece of literature. The means that are used for these purposes 
include rather subtle hints, such as beginning a paragraph with an affirmative 
“Yes” (294, 319) or including an expression like “To return” (280), which 
reminds readers that the text they are reading has been structured deliberately. In 
other cases, rhetorical devices, such as questions (“What was the matter with the 
master-at-arms?” (307)), are used to alert readers to the fact that they cannot know 
what the narrator does not tell them. Even more unambiguous in this respect are 
phrases like “A somewhat remarkable instance recurs to me” (279), which leave 
no doubt that all the information that is accessible to the reader comes from the 
narrator and has been filtered through his mind. The omniscience of the narrator is 
foregrounded even more strongly when he explicitly discusses some of the most 
conspicuous characteristics of his narrative. These include digressions from the 
main strand of the plot (“I am going to err into … a by-path” (291)), the degree of 
detail that is included in the narrative (“… it may be well to fill out that sketch of 
[Captain Vere] outlined in the previous chapter” (279)), the relation between 
narrative time and narrated time (“Of a series of incidents within a brief term 
rapidly following each other, the adequate narration may take up a term less brief” 
(347)), and, following from the previous point, explanations and comments that 
are included “to the better understanding” (347) of certain events of the story.  
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 Considering the different aspects of narrative agency that are contained in 
the passages just cited there can be no doubt that the narrator of Billy Budd 
possesses a fair amount of self-consciousness. At the same time, however, the 
picture of his narrative philosophy remains somewhat ambiguous. On the one 
hand, the limited number of openly intrusive comments does not seem to suggest 
that the narrator is particularly interested in making the reader aware of what he is 
doing. On the other hand, compared with a reader of “Bartleby” or “Benito 
Cereno”, it is much more difficult for a reader of Billy Budd to ignore the role of 
the narrator in deliberately structuring the story that he is reading. There are two 
simple reasons for this difference: Unlike in “Benito Cereno”, the narrator 
includes an obvious example of his influence on the shape of the narrative on the 
very first page; unlike in “Bartleby”, examples of this obvious influence are not 
limited to the first part of the story, but occur at later points in the narrative as 
well. Despite this discrepancy between the limited number of intrusive moments 
and their conspicuous placing within the narrative, the narrator’s understanding of 
his own role need not necessarily be interpreted as contradictory. In fact, the 
conjunction of outright intrusiveness on the one hand and a certain reserve 
towards self-reflexivity on the other is quite typical of a “traditional” narrator who 
is aware of his function in the process of storytelling but feels no need to expatiate 
on it because he takes it for granted. This uncomplicated conception of the 
narrator of Billy Budd is not in itself incorrect. It is, however, incomplete because 
it does not account for all aspects of the narrator’s “behavior”. One statement – 
the famous “ragged edges” remark – makes this immediately clear. The narrator’s 
assertion that “[t]he symmetry of form attainable in pure fiction can not so readily 
be achieved in a narration essentially having less to do with fable than with fact” 
(358) cuts right to the heart of one of the central questions surrounding the art of 
literature: Should literature be fashioned on the model of reality or should 
literature create its own reality and fashion it according to artistic imperatives? 
The narrator of Billy Budd seems to believe that the form of literature ought to be 
determined by the realities that it seeks to describe. Consequently, formal 
imperfections and irregularities in works of art are only natural because they 
correspond to the essentially irregular shape of reality. At first sight, this 
postulation of a word-to-world relation between literature and reality may seem a 
rather unambiguous statement in favor of literary realism. On second thought, 
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however, an outspoken endorsement of art as a kind of mimicry of life appears to 
be somewhat out of place with the usual design of Melvillean short prose. A 
consideration of the context of the narrator’s remark confirms this suspicion. The 
irregularities that he mentions explicitly refer to the segments that are added to the 
narrative as “something in way of sequel” (358). The word “sequel” alone is 
enough to recall the “sequel”(3) that the narrator of “Bartleby” adds to his story, 
as well as the parts of the “Benito Cereno” narrative that are “retrospectively, or 
irregularly given” (244). In both cases, there is no doubt that deviations from a 
strictly linear narration of the events concerning the title character are motivated 
not by the realities that underlie the story, but by the narrator’s desire to create a 
certain narrative effect. Since the nature of the documents that are contained in the 
sequel of Billy Budd are very similar to those in the sequels of “Bartleby” and 
“Benito Cereno”, there is reason to believe that by adding such a sequel to his 
story the narrator is not just trying to do justice to the events he recounts, but is in 
fact creating a narrative design that serves his own purposes. The narrator thus 
fails to comply with the maxim of a word-to-world relation between literature and 
reality that he himself evokes. Although he has all the trappings of an intrusive 
and omniscient narrator, he pretends that he cannot determine the form of his 
narrative at his own discretion. He may also appear to be less insistent than his 
“colleagues” of “Bartleby” and “Benito Cereno” about the need to add certain 
segments for a better understanding of the story as a whole. While in “Bartleby” 
the introductory remarks about the clerks are referred to as being “indispensable” 
(3) and the Benito Cereno deposition is considered “the key” (244) to the 
narrative that precedes it, all the narrator of Billy Budd has to say is that 
“something in way of sequel will not be amiss” (358). It should not be 
overlooked, however, that immediately before this remark the narrator concedes 
that “properly the story ends with [Billy’s] life” (358; my italics), which seems to 
be a hint that the addition of a sequel is in fact not required by the events that are 
dealt with in the main part of the narrative.  
 
 In the main part itself it is even more obvious that the narrator not only 
possesses comprehensive and prospective knowledge of the events of the story, 
but also makes use of his omniscience to manipulate the pace and shape of his 
narrative. Since Billy Budd is conveniently organized into chapters, it is quite easy 
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to detect and describe the deliberate structuring of its plot. In fact, the plot 
structure is so regular that it looks as if Melville had devised it with a copy of 
Freytag’s pyramid next to his manuscript. Following an extended exposition in 
chapters 1 to 8, the rising action sets in with the Dansker’s warning Billy against 
Claggart in chapter 9. The confrontation of the foretopman and the master-at-arms 
is increasingly emphasized through chapters 10 to 14. The conversation between 
Billy and the mutinous sailor in the forechains directs the action towards its 
turning point in chapter 18, which combines the sighting of an enemy ship and 
Claggart’s accusation of Billy before Captain Vere. The climax of the story – 
Billy kills Claggart – follows promptly in chapter 19. Now the “fourth act” begins 
and a series of retarding moments is used to “fill the time” before Billy is finally 
executed in chapter 25. After a conversation between the purser and the surgeon 
the hanging scene is completed in chapter 27. Chapters 28 to 30 constitute a kind 
of epilogue, which mentions Vere’s death in battle, the official report that closes 
the Billy Budd case for good, and the “Billy in the Darbies” poem. From a 
structural point of view, the epilogue closes the frame that the narrator opens at 
the beginning of chapter 1 with his remarks about the Handsome Sailor type. As 
this rapid overview clearly shows, the macro-structure of Billy Budd is far from 
being the result of a simple one-to-one transposition of reality into the domain of 
literature. Even if we accept that the events of the narrative do have a foundation 
in reality, the fact remains that the narrator makes use of all the devices that 
omniscient narrators usually draw on to create a narrative reality that corresponds 
to their own thematic and ideological concerns. He adds chapters that, strictly 
speaking, do not belong to the story at all; he highlights individual scenes, such as 
the spilled soup scene, that are emblematic of the overarching issues of the novel; 
he develops extensive portraits of the characters that the action of the narrative 
brings into conflict. While in some important scenes – the trial scene in particular 
– narrative time and narrated time are brought into congruence, in other cases 
large spans of time are omitted or the exact amount of time that elapses between 
two events remains unspecified. Combining all these narrative devices, the 
narrator creates a plot structure that, following a carefully crafted rising-falling 
movement, drives the action inexorably forward – first towards a decisive turn in 
the fortunes of the main character, then towards this character’s inevitable end. If 
this is not an example of the “symmetry of form attainable in pure fiction”, what 
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is it? If the narrator’s remark about the “ragged edges” of his narrative is already 
contradictory with respect to the sequel that he adds to his narrative, it appears to 
be outright incredible in the light of the deliberate structure of the story. One 
plausible conclusion that can be drawn from this discrepancy between what the 
narrator says and what he does is that his narrative stance is characterized by a 
particular kind of willful ambiguity that distinguishes him from the narrators of 
“Bartleby” and “Benito Cereno”. 
 
 Leaving aside questions of form and structure, it suffices to take a quick 
look at the story’s most central thematic issues – who is guilty?; who is innocent?; 
who is to blame for the deaths of Claggart and Billy? – to come to the conclusion 
that the narrator’s claims about the nature of the story that he tells do not 
correspond with reality. In the ragged edges paragraph, he emphatically asserts 
that his narrative offers the reader “truth uncompromisingly told”. How is it, then, 
that readers of Billy Budd invariably come away from reading the novel with a 
feeling of irresolvable ambiguity? How is it that critics completely disagree about 
the judgment that should be passed on Captain Vere? How uncompromising can a 
narrator’s desire to tell the truth really be if the readers of his story cannot even 
agree on whether Billy or Claggart is the villain of the story?
27
 The answer that I 
would like to suggest is that the narrator of Billy Budd is consciously pulling the 
reader’s leg by giving the impression that he is a mildly intrusive omniscient 
narrator who can be trusted to faithfully recount a story that has really happened. 
In actual fact, however, the narrator applies a strategy of double irony. He uses his 
unlimited narrative power, which he pretends he does not possess, to create a 
narrative that comes very close to being an example of “pure fiction”, but at the 
same time refuses to use his omniscience to provide an authoritative interpretation 
of the events he recounts.  
 
 Now that the narrator’s narrative strategy has been described in some 
detail, it is time to examine the repercussions that the application of such a 
strategy has for the moral evaluation of the story’s main characters. The first 
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character that will be considered is Captain Vere. Since his decision to execute 
Billy Budd constitutes the moral ur-problem of the narrative, it will be particularly 
interesting to see whether the narrator presents him in a positive or a negative 
light. Next in line is John Claggart. What is the narrator’s purpose in presenting a 
character that appears to be the embodiment of evil? Is he maybe less evil than it 
seems? Finally, Billy Budd himself will be subjected to close scrutiny. Is he really 
innocent or is there more to him than meets the eye? Before trying to answer such 
questions it is important to emphasize that the relevance of analyzing the way in 
which the narrator presents the foretopman and the master-at-arms lies solely in 
the contribution that such an analysis can make to our evaluation of Captain 
Vere’s behavior in the Billy Budd case. Put in slightly simplistic terms, if Billy is 
innocent and Claggart is evil, Vere can only be seen as siding with evil to destroy 
innocence. If Billy’s and Claggart’s personalities turn out to be more complex, we 
must refrain from drawing such stark conclusions. 
 
 
4.2. Captain Vere 
 
An obvious starting point for an examination of Captain Vere’s character is the 
extended portrait that the narrator develops in chapters 6 and 7. The importance of 
the two chapters is underlined at the beginning of chapter 7, where the narrator 
justifies the extension of his portrait by pointing to the central “part” that Captain 
Vere plays in the Billy Budd case (297). Yet despite this obvious hint, it would be 
wrong to consider every single detail of the narrator’s characterization to be 
directly relevant for a moral evaluation of Captain Vere. It would be equally 
wrong to accept the narrator’s portrait of Vere without trying to construe both a 
positive and a negative interpretation of all the pieces of information that are 
provided. The first paragraph of Vere’s characterization in chapter 6 illustrates 
what is meant. The narrator’s remark that Vere is “a sailor of distinction” is no 
doubt apt to create a rather positive image of the captain. It is also clear, however, 
that Vere’s sailing abilities have nothing to do with his moral integrity. Similarly, 
the fact that Vere is said to be “allied to the higher nobility” (295) has caused 
some critics to view the captain as “a frightened aristocrat” who maliciously 
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destroys “the Saxon Budd”.
28
 Such interpretations disregard the narrator’s explicit 
clarification that the captain’s noble descent is largely irrelevant to his position 
and function in the navy. Vere’s nobility, like his sealing abilities, should thus not 
be taken into account when evaluating the moral decisions that he makes in his 
function as a captain. Of much greater relevance to Vere’s role as a captain – and 
his moral character as a person – are the two remaining remarks in the initial 
paragraph of Vere’s characterization, the first of which describes the captain as 
being “mindful of the welfare of his men, but never tolerating an infraction of 
discipline”. This sentence not only points to the incongruity of Vere’s character 
traits; it is an exact restatement of the moral dilemma that he faces: Should he 
look to Billy’s “welfare” and spare him or should he punish him for the 
“infraction” that he has committed? By inscribing this dilemma in the 
characterization of the captain, the narrator makes it difficult to decide whether 
Vere acts in accordance with his own nature when he has Billy executed or 
whether he forces himself into an act which is incompatible with his disposition as 
a human being. If the narrator had removed either half of the sentence, there 
would probably be less debate about Vere’s dramatic change from “father” to 
“military disciplinarian” (332) in the scene where Billy kills Claggart; it would 
also be easier to determine which aspect of Vere’s behavior is more in tune with 
his real inner self. The second remark in the initial paragraph, which is concerned 
with Vere’s being “intrepid to the verge of temerity, though never injudiciously 
so” is less contradictory, but similarly inconclusive in that it simultaneously 
highlights and qualifies Vere’s intrepidity. Particularly problematic in this context 
is the narrator’s refusal to define what constitutes “injudicious” temerity. Is Vere’s 
behavior in the Billy Budd case “positively” intrepid or rather injudiciously so? If 
it is injudicious, should Vere be criticized for deviating from his normal judicious 
behavior or should he be lauded for overcoming his judiciousness in a moment 
when a certain degree of temerity is indispensable? Questions of this kind are 
simply not answerable on the basis of the information that is provided. It is not 
even clear beyond doubt whether this remark is a restatement of the welfare-
discipline clause which precedes it or whether it refers to Vere’s being “versed in 
the science of his profession” (295). In the former case, the remark has an 
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important, if ambiguous, contribution to make to a moral evaluation of Captain 
Vere, in the latter it must be considered to be completely irrelevant.  
 
 It is a fascinating feature of the narrator’s characterization of Captain Vere 
that this technique of creating ambiguous references between sentence elements is 
reflected in the macro-structure of the Billy Budd narrative. The most obvious 
example is the relation between the characterization of Captain Vere in chapters 6 
and 7 and the extended portrait of Admiral Nelson in chapter 4.
29
 However 
uncertain the purport of the narrator’s remarks about Vere’s temerity may be, 
there can be no doubt that they are intended to remind readers of the Great 
Sailor’s unquestionable boldness at Trafalgar. The Nelson chapter is thus not a 
mere “bypath” which the narrator includes for the sake of experiencing the 
pleasures of a “literary sin” (292); by recounting some of the best-known episodes 
of Nelson’s life as a sailor, the narrator creates a foil for the evaluation of Captain 
Vere. That this implicit comparison can only be harmful to the Bellipotent’s 
captain is obvious from the narrator’s boundless admiration for Lord Nelson. The 
character traits that he is most emphatic about are the admiral’s “excessive love of 
glory” and his lack of “[p]ersonal prudence” (293). This opposition of prudence, 
which, according to the narrator, is “no special virtue”, and love of glory, which is 
“the first” (293), reads like a prospective criticism of Vere’s “judicious temerity”. 
The narrator confirms his criticism by introducing the “star inserted in the 
Victory’s quarter-deck” (292) as the symbol of the Great Sailor’s recklessness. 
When the star symbol reappears in the lines quoted from the poem “Appleton 
House” (296), it is clear from the context that it is to be understood as an ironic 
comment on Vere’s inferiority compared to Lord Nelson. Similarly, the famous 
remark that Vere has “sterling qualities” but is “without any brilliant ones” (296) 
acquires a distinctly negative connotation when Vere’s lack of brilliance is 
compared with Nelson’s “shining deeds” (293) and his “sterling character” with 
Nelson’s star of glory – a comparison which is invited by the shared etymology 
and phonetic similarity of “star” and “sterling”. What is even more, in the poem 
the adjective “starry” appears in the context of severity – “the discipline severe” – 
as one of Vere’s defining character traits. In this regard, too, Nelson appears to be 
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largely superior to the Bellipotent’s captain. There is no need for the admiral to 
“terrorize the crew into base subjection” (294) because he can “win them, by force 
of his mere presence and heroic personality” – an ability which Captain Vere, 
whom the narrator labels a “disciplinarian” (332) and “martinet” (358), 
completely lacks.  
 
 The multitude of idealizing remarks about Nelson’s heroism and boldness 
makes it easy to overlook one comment about the admiral’s character which is not 
damaging to Captain Vere: the assertion that Nelson was always “painstakingly 
circumspect” in his “anxious preparations” (293) for an encounter with the enemy. 
While it is obvious that in general the narrator is impressed by Nelson’s lack of 
prudence, it is also clear that the use of the adjective “circumspect” – a near 
synonym of “prudent” – contradicts the claim that “personal prudence” is of no 
value in a sea captain. By making this distinction between Nelson’s behavior 
before and during battle the narrator seems to invite readers to consider carefully 
what kind of behavior is appropriate for which situation. Applied to the 
comparison of Nelson and Vere, such a consideration begs the question of which 
aspects of the admiral’s character are actually relevant for an evaluation of the 
actions that Vere takes in the Billy Budd case. In other words, is Nelson’s heroic 
courage really desirable in a situation which the narrator describes as a “moral 
dilemma” (336)? Is his “priestly motive” (293) to sacrifice himself in battle a 
valid point of comparison for the “clergyman” (348) who decides to have Billy 
executed? The narrator seems to answer these questions in the negative when in 
the trial chapter he says that above all Vere needs “prudence and rigor” (335). Yet 
this reevaluation of “personal prudence” creates even further ambiguities. The 
narrator himself admits that the combination of rigor and prudence is problematic 
because both qualities are “not readily interfusable” (335). It is also unclear 
whether the prudence which the narrator has in mind in the trial chapter coincides 
with the prudence which is criticized in the Nelson chapter. Similarly, there is no 
telling whether the rigor which Vere applies in executing Billy is included in the 
narrator’s idea of rigor or whether his conjunction of the terms “prudence” and 
“rigor” in one phrase does not suggest that he would have preferred a more lenient 
course of action. In the end, the narrator’s comments on Vere and Nelson form a 
hopelessly inconclusive picture of the narrator’s concept of prudence, rigor and 
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boldness. Explicit as his comments may be when considered in isolation, they 
become irresolvably contradictory when they are considered in combination.  
 
 Returning to the characterization of Vere in chapter 6, even more 
examples of this peculiar narrative strategy can be found. The narrator’s 
comments on Vere’s being “grave”, “undemonstrative” and much like “the King’s 
guest” (295) aboard the king’s ship take away from the initial qualification of 
Vere as a “sailor of distinction”. Shortly afterwards, this undemonstrativeness is 
explained as the “unaffected modesty of manhood” which is typical of a “resolute 
nature”, thus restoring Vere’s stature as an able sea captain. This back-and-forth 
between a positive and a negative presentation of Vere’s character again begs the 
question of why the narrator invests so much care in presenting information which 
is contradictory and, as far as the moral dimension is concerned, irrelevant. The 
king’s guest simile, which is mirrored by the remark that the captain is like “the 
King’s yarn in a coil of navy rope” (298), also shows that by continuing his 
description of Vere the narrator does not simply “fill out” the “sketch” developed 
in chapter 6, but that both chapters have been carefully conceived to form one 
entity. Here, the narrator seems to be outright disingenuous in his attempt to 
mislead readers and distort their view of his narrative. This desire to mislead is 
also obvious from the fact that a reader who detects the cross-reference suggested 
by the king simile will not gain much insight into the narrator’s thoughts about 
Vere’s character, since the king’s yarn simile is surrounded by the same kind of 
ambiguity which characterizes the king’s guest simile. Although the simile 
represents some of the most vivid criticism of Vere, it is also the only part in the 
two-chapter portrait that relies on other people’s opinions (“officers of [Vere’s] 
rank” (298)). By reporting those opinions the narrator clearly damages Captain 
Vere. Yet by citing those opinions in inverted commas he sets them off from his 
own opinions and, at least implicitly, suggests that the officers’ view is not 
necessarily correct. This warning is confirmed by the circumstance that the 
narrator criticizes the officers for having “minds” which are “less stored” and 
“less earnest” (298) than Captain Vere’s. In this context, it is possible to interpret 
the negative remarks made by the officers as an unwilling avowal of Vere’s 
intellectual superiority. Interestingly, it is this superiority which during the 
drumhead court session convinces the jury members to follow Vere in convicting 
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Billy Budd: The narrator says that they feel Vere to be “an earnest man, one too 
not less their superior in mind than in naval rank” (344). This kind of superiority, 
which is never attributed to Admiral Nelson, is also at the center of Vere’s 
characterization in the first part of chapter 7. Unlike the officers, who find fault 
with Vere’s “bookish” (298) nature, the narrator presents his “leaning toward 
everything intellectual” (297) in a positive light and makes sure to emphasize that 
the captain’s interest – as that of “every serious mind of superior order” – is in 
history and biography. While this rather general specification of Vere’s reading 
preferences attests to his capacity to comprehend complex situations, the mention 
of Montaigne must be taken as an ironic comment that is directed against the 
captain. The idea of “positive convictions”, which Vere hopes to find in the 
French philosopher’s works and which he thinks will “abide in him essentially 
unmodified” (297) until his death, is completely alien to the general spirit of 
Montaigne’s methodology, which is defined by skepticism and a refusal to 
postulate definite answers or truths.
30
 Although he does not acknowledge it, the 
narrator’s method of characterizing Captain Vere is defined by a very similar 
refusal to make any definitive statements.  
 
 The most important effect of such a lack of definiteness is that it strongly 
urges against using Vere’s characterization in chapters 6 and 7 as a point of 
reference for an evaluation of his behavior in the Billy Budd case. Whether or not 
this effect is considered to be problematic depends on the view that one takes of 
the captain’s actions in the latter part of the novel. If there is sufficient evidence to 
condemn or acquit him, there is no need to deal with the nitty-gritty details of his 
portrayal in the first part of the novel. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of the 
relevant chapters shows that they are just as inconclusive as the characterization in 
chapters 6 and 7. On the one hand, there is no denying the fact that following 
Claggart’s accusation of Billy Budd, Captain Vere seems to be presented in a 
rather negative light. Some of the most obvious aspects include his manipulation 
of the drumhead-court, his testifying “from the ship’s weather side” (337) to 
maintain his superiority of rank, his merciless talk about “martial law operating 
through us” (342) and his insistence on pitilessly administering that law – 
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regardless of Billy’s supposedly being “innocent before God” (342). The 
“troubled indecision” (340) of the other members of the drumhead court, their 
feeling “less convinced than agitated” (342) by Vere’s arguments and, not least, 
the surgeon’s concern that the captain might be “unhinged” (334) are all facts 
which seem to confirm that the narrator does not approve of the role that Vere 
plays in the proceedings against Billy Budd. On the other hand, it must not be 
overlooked that the narrator never explicitly condemns Captain Vere for what he 
does. The only authoritative statements that he makes are decidedly undecided: 
The captain “perhaps deviated from general custom” in selecting the members of 
the drumhead court, just as he “may or may not have erred” (335; my italics) in 
maintaining as much secrecy as possible. The jury members who feel uneasy 
about Vere’s determination to hang Billy are referred to as “well-meaning men 
not intellectually mature” (341); the Captain of Marines is considered to be “not 
… altogether reliable in a moral dilemma” (336). Both remarks, which are 
reminiscent of the emphasis that is put on Vere’s intellectual capacities in chapters 
6 and 7, would seem to disqualify the sailors from questioning the appropriateness 
of Vere’s actions, were it not for the fact that they reflect Vere’s personal 
judgments, not the narrator’s. More unambiguously negative is Vere’s own claim 
that the Mutiny Act is like “War’s child” (343) – a comparison which links Vere 
to the narrator’s harsh criticism of the Bellipotent’s chaplain. In fact, the 
narrator’s trenchant description of this “minister of Christ” (350) serving the “God 
of War” (352) and sanctioning “the abrogation of everything but brute Force” 
(352) is the only case in which a person on board the Bellipotent is described in an 
unambiguously negative way. Yet even this devastating association does not 
exclude the possibility of interpreting Vere’s appeals to duty and law in a positive 
way. After all, the captain’s evocation, at the beginning of his tirade about martial 
law, of “paramount obligations” (341) which force him to act against Billy Budd 
does have a foundation in the narrator’s lengthy comments, in chapters 3 and 5, on 
the importance of maintaining order in the British navy for the sake of protecting 
the peace of the world (290, 294).  
 
 As the examples examined in the previous paragraph clearly show, it 
would be vain to impose an unambiguously positive or negative judgment on 
Captain Vere’s behavior in the Billy Budd case. Since turning to the 
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characterization of Vere in chapters 6 and 7 in the hope of finding some clarifying 
remarks as to the captain’s “true” character has proved to be of no avail either, it 
has to be assumed that in his descriptions of the Bellipotent’s captain the narrator 
uses the same willfully ambiguous narrative strategy which we detected in his 
remarks about the form of his narrative and the art of storytelling in general.
31
  
 
 
4.3. Good vs. evil? – John Claggart and Billy Budd 
 
The preceding chapter ended with the assertion that Billy Budd does not contain 
definite meanings or solutions that a reader could hope to find. So far, this has 
only been demonstrated with regard to the personality of the Bellipotent’s captain. 
The remaining two sections will extend the analysis of the narrator’s willful 
ambiguity to his descriptions of the two figures on whom Vere acts and who act 
on him: Claggart and Billy. Before launching into this examination, however, I 
would briefly like to evoke certain concepts and interpretations which I will 
tacitly acknowledge – but not endorse – in the course of my following 
considerations. The first concept is that of Billy as the embodiment of the 
innocent Christ and Claggart as the malicious, serpent-like Satan. The second 
interpretation, proposed by Gail Coffler, consists in viewing the Billy/Claggart 
couple as a “Hellenism/Hebraism dichotomy”
32
 in which Billy is the joyous, 
carefree Hellenic figure and Claggart the dark Hebraic figure who is obsessed 
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with the idea of man’s inherent sinfulness. While both views rely on substantial 
evidence in the text, they do not incorporate all of the relevant aspects of Billy’s 
and Vere’s personalities. I will try to show that the narrator’s descriptions of the 
foretopman and the master-at-arms contain both positive and negative elements, 
so that for both figures “friendly” and “unfriendly” readings can coexist side by 
side. In order to demonstrate this, I will first consider the aspects of the narrator’s 
characterizations that lie outside the domain of Christianity and antiquity. Then 
the narrator’s associations of both characters with figures taken from the Bible 
and Greek mythology will be examined in some detail. In this context it is 
important to acknowledge another aspect of Coffler’s interpretation, namely that 
Billy Budd plays with – but, as I will suggest, does not accept – the “Greek view 
of external beauty as a visible sign of inner beauty”.
33
 A combination of all three 
approaches – general characterization, the question of internal vs. external beauty 
and the use of Christian/classical allusions – will yield some insight into the 
complex and singularly ambiguous concept of good and evil which Melville 
develops in his final work of fiction.  
 
 
4.3.1. John Claggart 
 
 At first glance, the descriptions of John Claggart in Billy Budd seem to 
constitute an exception to the general rule that the narrator does not like to make 
unequivocal statements about the things and persons he describes. This is 
particularly obvious in chapter 17, where the narrator’s use of what Hershel 
Parker
34
 has called a “Hawthornesque” style of character portrayal creates 
sentences as the following: “But upon any abrupt unforeseen encounter a red light 
would flash forth from [Claggart’s] eye like a spark from an anvil in a dusk 
smithy” (321). The important point here is that this passage, which is reminiscent 
of the description of Roger Chillingworth in chapter 10 of The Scarlet Letter, not 
only imitates certain superficial details of Hawthornian character description; it 
reveals the narrator’s adoption of the fundamental idea that a radically flat 
character can be used to symbolize an abstract force, such as evil, which is at 
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work in a narrative. The narrator puts this idea into practice by creating a 
description of Claggart which allows for only one interpretation: Claggart is 
literally full of evil; his evil is like a tangible substance which occupies the 
interior of his body and which makes him the ambulatory representative of its 
own immaterial reality. Although such a one-dimensional characterization is 
clearly incongruous with any other instance of character portrayal that we have 
considered so far, it cannot be denied that there are many other places in the novel 
where the narrator leaves no doubt that Claggart is simply and plainly evil: He is 
the “reverse of a saint” (308), who has “elemental evil in him” (312) and is 
controlled by the “mania of an evil nature” (310). His “disdain of innocence” 
(312) translates into boundless “envy” of Billy’s innocence, which he takes care 
to hide under a “mantle of respectability” (309) and “retributive righteousness” 
(314). There is no doubt either that the “clandestine persecution” of Billy is 
organized by Claggart, who, the narrator affirms, is “secretly down on him” (307). 
What positive points can be adduced against such overwhelmingly negative 
statements? For one thing, it is interesting that in chapter 8 the narrator spends 
much narrative time on relating certain rumors about Claggart, which, as he 
himself admits, “nobody could substantiate” (300). As the narration continues, the 
questionableness of the narrator’s remarks becomes more and more palpable. On 
the one hand, the surmises about the master-at-arms grow increasingly outlandish. 
He is supposed to be a “chevalier” (299) trying to avoid criminal prosecution by 
accepting to serve in the Royal Navy, a “questionable fellow” caught by the 
police, a “promiscuous lame duck of morality” (300) and finally even an inmate 
“culled direct from the jails” (301). On the other hand the narrator constantly 
reminds us that all of this is merely a “rumor” spread by “certain grizzled sea 
gossips” (299) and “tarry old wiseacres”. He refuses to “vouch” (300) for the truth 
of the claim that sailors are recruited straight out of jail and later even contradicts 
himself by saying that Claggart’s depravity is not of the kind “which the gallows 
and jail supply” (309). If, as the narrator asserts, “the less credence was to be 
given to the gun-deck-talk” (301) for the simple reason that a master-at-arms, by 
virtue of his office, is always unpopular with the crew, the question arises why so 
much time is spent on reporting unverified rumors which clearly damage the 
master-at-arms’ reputation. It is also interesting that the narrator picks out certain 
aspects of Claggart’s personality and uses them against him, while with regard to 
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other characters some of these very same aspects are either interpreted positively 
or not commented on at all. For example, we are told that in Claggart’s speech 
there “lurked a bit of an accent suggesting that possibly he was not such by birth, 
but through naturalization” (299). While in the case of the Dansker – “long 
anglicized in the service” (303) – nothing is made of his foreign descent, in the 
case of Claggart it provides a springboard for presenting all the rumors I have just 
mentioned. Similarly, the fact that nothing is known about Claggart’s life before 
entering the navy inspires the narrator to compare his past with “a comet’s travels 
prior to its first observable appearance in the sky” (301). Irrespective of whether 
this is a reference to the “meteor” which appears in the sky while Hester and 
Dimmesdale, the two sinners of The Scarlet Letter, stand on the scaffold at night, 
it is clear that the comet image carries distinctly negative overtones. Matters are 
completely different with Billy Budd. The fact that nothing is known about his 
past because he is a foundling does not seem to prompt the narrator to make 
negative comments about him. Instead, he has the officer who musters Billy into 
the navy say that he is “a pretty good find” (287) and spends the first half of 
chapter 2 speculating about the foretopman’s “[n]oble descent” and “lineage”, 
which he believes to be “in direct contradiction to his lot” (287). Why does the 
narrator allow for such inconsistencies in his character portrayals? Because he is 
biased against Claggart, one may answer. Why is it, then, that he does not take 
better care to conceal his bias, in some cases almost pointing at it with his finger? 
Maybe because his antipathy to Claggart is not that heartfelt after all. 
 
 One aspect of Claggart’s characterization which is even more clearly 
positive concerns his external appearance. According to the assumption that 
internal and external beauty go together, the master-at-arms should be a truly 
hideous figure. Yet in fact, the opposite is the case. The narrator explicitly says 
that he is “of no ill figure”, his hands are “shapely” and he has a “notable” face 
and “cleanly cut” features (299). Following the chapter in which Claggart’s 
supposed depravity is exposed the narrator repeats that “Claggart’s figure was not 
amiss, and his face … well molded” (311). In the spilled soup scene the narrator 
again uses the word “shapely”, this time in reference to Claggart’s mouth (306). 
The narrator also offers a rather plausible explanation for the only external feature 
of Claggart which is described as being displeasing. The “pallor” of his skin, 
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which, in the eyes of the narrator, “seemed to hint of something defective or 
abnormal in [his] constitution and blood” (299) and which stands in “marked 
contrast” (311) with Billy’s “rose-tan”, is not so much the sign of inherent 
depravity, but simply “the result of his official seclusion from the sunlight” (299). 
A similar warning against making moral inferences on the basis of external 
appearance is contained in two remarks that the narrator makes about Claggart’s 
forehead. In the first one (299) he claims that the master-at-arms has a forehead 
“phrenologically associated with more than average intellect”, yet in the second 
one, which is concerned with Claggart’s conscience, he asserts that “consciences 
are unlike as foreheads” (313). Although this sentence is apparently intended to 
question the functionality of Claggart’s conscience, it also begs the question of 
why phrenology should be applied to intellectuality – or any aspect of a person’s 
character, for that matter, including depravity and innocence – if it does not apply 
to conscience. 
 
 The most important point in my analysis of the narrator’s characterization 
of the master-at-arms concerns his use of allusions to Christianity and antiquity. 
First of all, it is important to note that Claggart is not the Hebrew Old Testament 
character which Coffler takes him to be. Early on in chapter 8 his face is 
compared with a “Greek medallion” and the pallor of his skin with “the hue of 
time-tinted marbles” (299). This association of Claggart with Greek antiquity is 
repeated in chapter 11, where the supposedly Platonic concept of “Natural 
Depravity: a depravity according to nature” (309) is evoked. The introduction of 
this concept as a reference point for the moral evaluation of Claggart is 
particularly remarkable in that it appears to be largely superfluous. Apart from the 
fact that, as Jonathan A. Yoder has remarked, “this is not Plato at his most 
complex”,
35
 there is nothing in the concept of “a depravity according to nature” 
which readers would not be able to deduce from the narrator’s references to 
Claggart’s evil nature in other parts of the novel. Why, then, does the narrator 
make use of this concept? His explanation that he cannot use “that lexicon which 
is based on Holy Writ” (309) because it is unpopular with his readers is not very 
convincing. If he really wanted to avoid Christian allusions, why does he mention 
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“Holy Writ” at all? And why does he choose to conclude chapter 11 with a 
reference to the biblical phrase “mystery of iniquity” (310)? The most plausible 
explanation is that the narrator uses the literary taste of his readers as an excuse to 
introduce two alternative reference points for a moral evaluation of Claggart, 
thereby questioning the idea of a one-to-one equation of the master-at-arms with 
an Old Testament Antichrist-serpent figure. This claim is confirmed by the fact 
that the narrator’s desire to avoid oversimplification is reflected not only by the 
use of Christian and classical allusions but also by the narrative structure which is 
used to accommodate these allusions. Before the narrator begins his examination 
of Claggart’s character, he states that he will use the method of “indirection” 
(308). What this means becomes clear when at the end of his lengthy discussion 
about the characteristics of a depraved person the narrator adds the qualifying 
remark that Claggart is only “something such an one” (310; my italics). As in his 
presentation of Billy in chapter 1, where the foretopman is said to be “something 
such too in nature [i.e. something like a Handsome Sailor]” (280), the narrator 
amasses information about individuals which are never explicitly equated with the 
character that he has set out to describe. This technique clearly questions the 
validity and relevance of the narrator’s own definitions of depravity, including his 
allusions to Christianity and antiquity.  
 
 The narrative method of “indirection” as it is used in chapter 11 is an 
excellent illustration of the narrator’s efforts to balance Christian and classical 
references with regard to Claggart’s character. At the same time, it is the first in a 
row of passages where the narrator is concerned with establishing a balance 
between the positive and negative connotations within the domain of Christian 
allusions. In the conversation about an “unimpeachably respectable” man, which 
immediately follows the announcement of an indirect description of Claggart’s 
character, the name of this respectable person is not written out; only the first 
letter – an X – is indicated. Given the fact that this letter is most likely not the first 
letter of an English family name, it is not implausible to interpret it as the first 
letter in the Greek word Χριστός, the epithet most commonly attributed to Jesus 
of Nazareth.
36
 Further confirmation of the Claggart-as-Christ thesis comes from a 
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later comparison of the master-at-arms with “the man of sorrows” (321), an 
obvious reference to Isaiah 53, 3. God’s “servant” (52:13), whose fate is 
recounted in Isaiah 52 and 53, is normally interpreted as the Old Testament 
archetype of Jesus Christ.
37
 Does this mean that by suffering death following his 
accusation of Billy the master-at-arms “hath borne our griefs, and carried our 
sorrows” (53:4)? Is he the envoy of God whom the crew of the Bellipotent 
“esteemed … not” (53:3)? A single biblical reference is certainly not enough to 
make such a strong claim. Nonetheless, the strong emphasis which the biblical 
story places on the irrelevance of exterior appearance – God’s servant has neither 
“form nor comeliness” nor “beauty” (53:2) – does support the idea that Claggart’s 
relative unattractiveness in comparison with Billy does not disqualify him from 
being appointed God’s representative on earth. It is also interesting to note that 
Billy – the more obvious Christ figure of the story – possesses all the external 
attributes which God’s envoy is explicitly said to lack: an heroic “form”, 
“comeliness” and “beauty” (311). 
 
 Claggart’s association with God is confirmed in almost all other passages 
where the narrator alludes to biblical stories. A rather obvious example is the 
mystery of iniquity passage, which has already been mentioned. There can be no 
doubt that the narrator presents Claggart as the Antichrist, whose “coming is after 
the working of Satan” (2 Thessalonians 2:9). What the narrator does not mention, 
however, is the fact that the authors of the epistle to the Thessalonians make it 
very clear that the apparition of “the Wicked” (2:8) is a necessary precondition for 
the second coming of Jesus. If this hint from the context of the mystery of iniquity 
passage is taken seriously, it becomes inevitable to accept that Claggart is part of 
God’s “master plan” and that he acts on his behalf in accusing Billy. The narrator 
seems to confirm this interpretation by questioning Claggart’s free will in other 
places in the novel. It is true that he attacks him for having a conscience that is 
“but the lawyer to his will” (314), but he also associates him with a scorpion “for 
which the Creator alone is responsible” and which must “act out to the end the 
part allotted it” (312). In the spilled soup scene, which is normally seen as 
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encapsulating the antagonism between Billy and the master-at-arms, Claggart is 
described as acting only “to some extent willfully” (312; my emphasis). The 
importance of this question is of course related to the fact that if Claggart’s 
actions are determined by God, Captain Vere’s behavior in the Billy Budd case 
must also be seen in the context of a divinely ordained providence. Such a 
consideration can lead to either of the following conclusions: Vere must not be 
condemned because he cannot be expected to master a situation where all cards 
have so obviously been stacked against him; or, Vere must be condemned because 
he belongs to those people whose “deceivableness of unrighteousness” (2:10), 
according to the authors of 2 Thessalonians, prompts God to “send them strong 
delusion, that they should believe a lie” (2:11). Which alternative one prefers 
depends on how far one is willing to go in taking the context of the narrator’s 
biblical references into consideration.  
 
 Another biblical reference which allows for varying degrees of context-
sensitive interpretation concerns the story of Saul and David in 1 Samuel. It is 
quite natural for the narrator to identify the “comely” David (16:18) whom “all 
Israel and Judah loved” (18:16) with Billy and the envious Saul with the master-
at-arms. Yet several other elements in the book of Samuel do not seem to fit the 
picture. Most importantly, David is not only handsome, but also a “man of war” 
(16:18) and Saul’s attempts to kill David are due to the fact that “the evil spirit 
from God came upon [him]” (18:10), which, on the level of the novel, means that 
Claggart-Saul is under the direct influence of God when he acts on Billy-David. 
The story of Saul and David also contains a very clear statement of the idea that 
“man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart” 
(16:7). Although this quotation refers to David being the anointed one, it can also 
be read as a reminder that an attractive appearance does not necessarily equal an 
attractive character. It is maybe also interesting to remark that before Daniel 
became the anointed one it was Saul who was privileged by God. He later fell in 
disgrace not because he was wicked but because he failed to execute fully God’s 
revenge on the Amalekites (15:1-26). 
 
 The examples that I have analyzed are certainly not enough to reinterpret 
Claggart as the actual Christ figure of the novel. They are sufficient, however, to 
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exclude one-dimensional interpretations of his character. The narrator’s 
straightforward associations of Claggart with evil are contradicted by the 
heterogeneity which is characteristic of most of his other descriptions of the 
master-at-arms. This heterogeneity is not restricted to the question of external 
appearance or the narrator’s use of classical and Christian allusions; it is most 
obvious in his selection of biblical reference points which do not allow for simple 
one-to-one equations of any of the novel’s characters with any of the biblical 
figures that are mentioned. The narrator gives us enough hints to understand that 
Claggart is not only the embodiment of Old Testament sinfulness, but he refuses 
to provide us with enough hints to develop a convincing alternative interpretation. 
This inconclusive characterization of the master-at-arms squares perfectly with the 
narrator’s general narrative strategy, which consists in generating a large amount 
of descriptive material without enabling his readers to use this material to develop 
a conclusive interpretation of the story.  
 
 
4.3.2. Billy Budd 
 
Billy Budd’s moral constitution appears to be as unquestionably sound as 
Claggart’s appears to be corrupt. This spontaneous impression derives from the 
fact that the narrator is often very outspoken about Billy’s supposedly impeccable 
character. He tells us, for example, that the foretopman possesses “essential 
innocence” (352) and has “never willed malice” (311). As soon as one subjects 
the narrator’s descriptions to closer scrutiny, however, one must come to the 
conclusion that the question of the foretopman’s innocence is so puzzlingly 
complex that it defies simplifying interpretations. Among the most conspicuously 
problematic issues are the following: the incongruity of appearance and reality, 
the exact nature of Billy’s innocence and, last but not least, the heterogeneity of 
the narrator’s references to classical and Christian figures and events. 
 
 The issue of appearance figures very prominently in the Handsome Sailor 
prologue in chapter 1. The narrator takes obvious pleasure in describing the 
Sailor’s “superb figure”, praising above all his unique combination of “strength 
and beauty” (280). When it comes to evaluating the Handsome Sailor’s moral 
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nature, however, the narrator is considerably less enthusiastic in his praise. By 
asserting that the “moral nature was seldom out of keeping with the physical 
make” (280; my emphasis), he alerts readers to the possibility that an outwardly 
handsome sailor may well be ugly with regard to his moral constitution. This idea 
of distinguishing the moral and the physical nature of a person combines with the 
uncertain equation of Billy with the Handsome Sailor type – “Such a cynosure, at 
least in aspect, and something such too in nature, though with important 
variations” (280; my emphasis) – to form one of the most elaborately 
foregrounded themes of the novel: the dissociation of beauty from goodness. 
Many of the remarks that the narrator makes about Billy’s character and 
appearance in later chapters can be related to this central idea. The most damaging 
of these remarks expresses the idea that Billy’s good looks literally cover his less 
peaceful interior. A central metaphor in this context is Billy’s tan, which is so 
deep that “the rose had some ado visibly to flush through” (286). Interestingly, 
Claggart uses exactly the same image when he accuses the foretopman before 
Captain Vere; he warns that a “man-trap may be under his ruddy-tipped daisies” 
(327; my emphasis). Confirmation of the master-at-arms’ surmise is provided in 
the prison scene, where we learn that through “the rose-tan of [Billy’s] 
complexion, no pallor could have shown” (350). This statement emphasizes the 
possibility that Billy’s tan functions as a cover which conceals his true emotions – 
in this case, anguish in the face of impending execution – and consequently also 
his true character. In conjunction with the added remark that only “days of 
sequestration from the winds and the sun” (350) could remove Billy’s tan, it 
confirms our earlier interpretation that Claggart’s pallor is merely a superficial 
feature which does not say anything about his moral character.  
 
 In addition to the narrator’s comments about the obscuring function of 
Billy’s tan there are at least three further instances of character portrayal which 
refer to the problematic equation of beauty and goodness. The first example 
concerns Billy’s muscular strength. Although the foretopman is introduced in 
chapter 2 as having an “all but fully developed frame” – together with an “all but 
feminine” face – (286), he is later described as having an “athletic frame” (305) 
and “thews” (321). While the foretopman’s strength may not be immediately 
relevant to judging his moral character, it does influence our readiness to accept 
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that he is capable of willfully striking out at someone. The admission that Billy is 
not quite so feeble and effeminate as the narrator’s initial comments may suggest 
is a clear hint that not even his external appearance need necessarily be interpreted 
to imply that he is all innocence. The second example concerns the question of 
whether Billy qualifies as a hero. The narrator affirms that “the form of Billy 
Budd was heroic” (311), yet when he tells us about Billy’s stutter he claims that 
because of this imperfection Billy is no “conventional hero” (289). It is relatively 
easy to resolve this contradiction by concluding that only Billy’s form is heroic, 
but not his character. In the third example the narrator appears to spell out the 
implications of his previous two remarks. He says that it is typical of landsmen to 
“exercise a distrust keen in proportion to the fairness of the appearance” (320). 
Although this remark refers to the characteristically unsuspecting character of 
Billy the seaman, it can also be read as a restatement of the warning that with 
regard to the foretopman’s alleged innocence a “keen distrust” is not out of place.  
 
 The complexity of Billy Budd’s character, which the descriptions of the 
foretopman’s external appearance so clearly point to, is most elaborately 
described in the context of the narrator’s allusions to classical mythology and 
Christian religion. The complexities which exist in the domain of classical 
allusions derive from the fact that Billy is associated not only with one but with 
several figures of Greek mythology, above all Apollo (284) and Hercules (287). 
As Gail Coffler has mentioned,
38
 neither figure qualifies as an innocent 
“peacemaker” (283). Apollo, the god of healing and the arts, uses his bow as a 
deadly weapon and sends plague onto those he wishes to punish. Particularly 
gruesome cases of punishment include his revenge on Niobe – he kills her seven 
sons because she insulted Leto, his mother – and his flaying of Marsyas, who 
challenged the God to a musical contest. Hercules’ track record is no less 
questionable. While he is generally recognized as the embodiment of valiance and 
virtue, he also has a reputation of being a simpleton who uses his muscles rather 
than his brains. He strangles the snakes that Hera sends to kill him when he is a 
baby, but he also kills Linos, his teacher, who dared to reprimand him for a 
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mistake that he made playing the kithara. An even more shocking episode 
involves Hercules’ killing all his children in a fit of madness.  
 
 In view of so obviously negative elements in both Hercules’ and Apollo’s 
biographies it is safe to conclude that the association of Billy with these figures 
serves to highlight the problematic complexity of the foretopman’s character. The 
full extent to which these complexities are foregrounded by the narrator is best 
understood by examining not only the individual characters that are mentioned but 
also the multitude of interconnections that exist between them. The most 
important link between Hercules and Apollo, for example, is that they fight for the 
tripod of the oracle in Delphi. Zeus has to intervene and punishes Hercules by 
making him a slave of Omphale, the queen of Lydia. The conflict between both 
figures is also reflected in the fact that Linos, whom Hercules kills, is normally 
considered to be the son of Apollo. A similar relationship holds between Helios, 
who is often equated with Apollo, and Hercules, who shoots his arrows at Helios 
on his way to Erytheia.
39
 The picture becomes even more complicated when the 
role of Achilles, another of Billy’s alter egos (306), is taken into consideration. 
Billy-as-Achilles is educated by the centaur Chiron, yet in the guise of Hercules 
he wounds him with a poisoned arrow, so that the centaur is forced to cede his 
immortality to Prometheus to be able to die. Interestingly, in the battle of Troy, it 
is Apollo who guides Paris’ deadly arrow into Achilles’ heel. Irrespective of these 
links between Achilles, Hercules and Apollo, it is quite telling that the Greek 
warrior is chosen as a metaphorical vehicle for the description of Billy, given that 
it is his wrath which, according to the famous opening line of the Iliad, is the 
driving force of the Trojan war. This wrath is caused by the decision of 
Agamemnon – the alter ego of the Dansker, an “Agamemnon man” (304) – to take 
away Achilles’ favorite slave to compensate the loss of his own slave, whom he 
was forced to return to the Trojans following a plague sent by Apollo on demand 
of the Trojan priest Chryses. The mythological background related to 
Agamemnon suggests that the Dansker’s influence on Billy is not altogether 
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positive and that his warnings against the master-at-arms may influence Billy 
more than it seems.  
 
 This tightly knit net of classical references shows three things: firstly, it is 
hard to imagine that the narrator chooses his mythological reference points 
randomly, without being aware of the manifold interconnections which exist 
between them; secondly, the most important referents which the narrator makes 
use of all have one thing in common: they may be associated with many different 
qualities in Greek mythology, but they certainly do not represent meekness, let 
alone innocence. Achilles is most famous for with wrath and his revenge on 
Hector, while Apollo is most famous for his revenge on Niobe and Marsyas. 
Hercules embodies the problematic concept of combined strength and ignorance, 
which does not automatically yield innocence. Thirdly, there can be no doubt that 
the narrator wants us to see Billy as a complex character. It is hardly possible to 
imagine a narrative device which would put greater emphasis on this point than 
the combination of allusions to different mythological figures. In the metaphorical 
world of mythology, Billy really “is” several characters which fight each other. In 
reality – the reality of the narrative, at least – he “is” several components which 
do not combine to form a homogeneous whole.  
 
 In the domain of Christian metaphors we find a pattern which at first sight 
appears to be far more unified than the classical pattern. This is certainly true with 
regard to the apparently all-dominating association of Billy with Christ. The 
evidence in favor of this association is abundant: Billy is hanged from the cross-
shaped mainmast – for “special reasons” (353) which are never specified –; he 
“ascends” in the early light of “dawn” – an imitation of Jesus’ crucifixion in “the 
third hour” (Marc 15:25) –; the narrator evokes the “Lamb of God” (354) at the 
moment of execution and later associates the “spar from which the foretopman 
was suspended” with “the Cross” (361).  
 
 In many other cases, however, the connotations of Christian references are 
less unambiguous. One of the most noteworthy elements in this respect is the 
biblical serpent. In chapter 2, the narrator remarks that Billy is without “any trace 
of the wisdom of the serpent, nor yet quite a dove” (287). This is an allusion to 
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Matthew 10:16, where Jesus asks of his disciples to be “as shrewd as snakes and 
as innocent as doves”. A comparison of the narrator’s comment and the Bible 
passage shows two things: firstly, a snake simile does not necessarily carry 
negative connotations in a biblical context; secondly, and more importantly, Billy 
is not innocent because the narrator refuses to compare him with a dove. How can 
he be a Jesus-like figure if he does not meet one of the crucial criteria that Jesus 
himself establishes for his disciples? A possible way out of this New Testament 
dilemma seems to be contained in the narrator’s comparison of Billy with the Old 
Testament figure of Adam “ere the … Serpent wriggled himself into his 
company” (288), that is “before the Fall” (327). Yet while on the surface this 
reference to Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden serves to highlight Billy’s 
innocence, it also reminds us that these two innocents did in fact disobey God’s 
injunction not to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Eve eats from 
the tree because she takes it to be “a tree to be desired to make one wise” (Genesis 
3:6). Apparently, her ignorance and innocence are not so great as to exclude even 
the faintest idea of what it would be like to possess knowledge. Her desire to lose 
her ignorance clearly speaks against the narrator’s presentation of Billy as an 
utterly ignorant and innocent angel who knows nothing about the temptations of 
the world. As far as the serpent is concerned, it is important to realize that, just 
like the scorpion, it is a creature of God (Genesis 3:1) and as such is not opposed, 
but subordinated to his will. The dialogue between Eve and the serpent is 
sometimes read as an interior monologue which is used to give a discursive form 
to Man’s prelapsarian capacity to be attracted by evil.
40
 Considering this biblical 
background, it is interesting to note that the narrator is very clear about the 
influence of the Edenic serpent on Billy’s character. The “envious marplot of 
Eden”, he tells us, “still has more or less to do with every human consignment to 
this planet of earth” (289). Thus, if Billy is Adam, he is Adam after, but not 
before, the Fall. 
  
 In our discussion of the narrator’s classical allusions we noted that it is the 
combination of different incongruous elements which creates the impression that 
Billy is a complex and ambiguous character. In the domain of Christian allusions 
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this “cramming together” of referents does not seem to occur to the same extent. 
There are, however, two instances in which the narrator combines classical and 
Christian elements in order to provide contradictory interpretations of Billy’s 
external appearance. The first example appears in the narrator’s description of 
Billy’s inability to speak in his confrontation with Claggart. The master-at-arms’ 
accusations are described as “bringing to his face an expression which was as a 
crucifixion to behold” and as giving “an expression to the face like that of a 
condemned Vestal priestess in the moment of being buried alive” (331). The 
formal similarities between the two sentences cannot conceal the fact that they 
clearly contradict each other. The Christian image suggests that Billy is an 
innocent victim, while the classical image suggests quite the contrary. Vestal 
priestesses were only buried alive when they had committed the sin of breaking 
their vow of chastity. The second example, which takes the technique of fusing 
incongruous images to an extreme, is to be found in chapter 24 (351). Billy the 
“barbarian” – another epithet which does not necessarily suggest innocence – is 
“made to march in the Roman triumph of Germanicus”, a Roman general, but he 
is also “among the earlier British converts to Christianity” admired by the Pope. 
In the first sentence, Rome is the center of a pagan Empire, in the second it is the 
center of Christianity. This binary opposition of a classical and a Christian 
referent is extended in the following sentence. First, the narrator compares Billy 
with “Fra Angelico’s seraphs”, angels which are comparable with the cherubim 
“placed at the east of the garden of Eden” (Genesis 3:24). So far, the picture is 
still in order. Then, however, the angels are described as “plucking apples in 
gardens of the Hesperides”. This is a clear transgression into the world of Greek 
mythology, the golden apples of the Hesperides being the object of Hercules’ 
eleventh labor. Finally, the bizarrely Hercules-like seraphs are said to “have the 
faint rose-bud complexion of the more beautiful English girls”. Within one 
sentence the narrator jumps from the question of sin and innocence – Adam in the 
Garden of Eden – to a rather trivial theft – Hercules in the Garden of the 
Hesperides – and back to the morally problematic issue of Billy’s “rose-tan”. It is 
characteristic of the narrator’s desire to create ambiguity that he uses the novel’s 
final instance of extended character portrayal to create an elaborate mixed 
metaphor which combines all three aspects that are important for an evaluation of 
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Billy’s character – external appearance, Christian and classical metaphors –, but 
which, in the end, does not tell us anything about who or what he really is.  
 
 At the beginning of this chapter the question was asked whether Billy 
Budd can be said to possess a narrative strategy that distinguishes it from 
“Bartleby” and “Benito Cereno”. In the light of the preceding discussion, it can be 
concluded that the narrative strategy of Billy Budd consists in the narrator’s desire 
to create a narrative that is defined by an all-permeating feeling of ambiguity. This 
willful ambiguity is evident in the narrator’s misleading remarks about the nature 
of his story, it determines his undecided characterization of Captain Vere, and it is 
also responsible for his conspicuously heterogeneous description of both Billy’s 
and Claggart’s moral constitution. The consequences of such a narrative strategy 
are obvious. If we do not know whether Billy is really the embodiment of angelic 
innocence and Claggart the corresponding embodiment of satanic evil, how can 
we pass a definite judgment on Captain Vere? How can we say whether he is 
guilty in a metaphysical sense without knowing whether Billy and Claggart are 
intended to be understood as divine agents that act on the behalf of God?  
 
 I would like to add one final word about the concept of ambiguity. In the 
case of Billy Budd, ambiguity also means that the narrator willfully creates a 
considerable discrepancy between elaborate form and elusive meaning. In fact, the 
discrepancy is often so massive – think of the seraphs-Hercules metaphor – that 
we are forced to regard the gap between form and meaning as the only meaning 
which the narrator wants us to understand. Without venturing into the theoretical 
domain of deconstruction, I think it makes sense to postulate that Melville wants 
to tell us that our attempts to squeeze meaning out of his novel will inevitably lead 
to the conclusion that the solid and concrete information we hope to find will turn 
out to be complex, contradictory and volatile. Like the Hydra of the Hercules 
myth, for every aspect of the story that we try to resolve the text creates two 
conflicting interpretations which make our “labor” all the more difficult. Thus, 
Billy Budd represents the avowal that in questions of morality definiteness is not a 
valid goal to pursue. This does not mean that Melville accepts the world as it is. 
His final stage is neither acceptance nor irony. It is rather the ironic acceptance of 
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the fact that neither acceptance nor irony should be considered to provide a 
sufficient response to the moral complexities of the world. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In the introduction of this paper I insisted on the fact that although “Bartleby”, 
“Benito Cereno” and Billy Budd may seem to be concerned with three unrelated 
topics – Wall Street, slavery, mutiny –, all three stories are characterized by a 
largely identical basic pattern: A self-confident “man of the world” is confronted 
with a “phenomenal” other person whose behavior prompts him to make a fateful 
decision. It is this decision – the lawyer decides to leave Bartleby, Vere decides to 
execute Billy and Delano decides to ignore the mysteries of the San Dominick – 
which defines the basic moral question underlying all three stories: How can we 
know what constitutes morally sound behavior? Each of the three stories proposes 
a radically different answer to this question. As my preceding analysis has shown, 
the decisive factor in describing these answers is to be found in the narrative 
configurations of the three stories. It is no exaggeration to say that by choosing a 
particular kind of narrator and by endowing him with a particular narrative 
strategy, Melville determines not only the form but also the moral tenor of the 
stories he tells. The most important element to be considered in this context is the 
point of view from which each narrative is told because it determines both the 
kind of narrative behavior and the kind of interaction with the readers that a 
narrator can engage in.  
 
 The narrator of “Bartleby” is a first-person narrator whose comments 
about the form of his narrative show that he is aware of the deliberate structuring 
of his story. In addition, the way in which he describes his clerks and Bartleby 
suggests that he has at least some understanding of the fact that the subject of his 
story is his own moral constitution. There is, however, no definite proof of this 
understanding because the narrator does not make enough comments that would 
allow us to conclude that his narrative strategy is really used as a deliberate means 
to examine his own character. This degree of narrative awareness is mirrored by 
the narrator’s moral attitude. Just as he never explicitly says that he knows what 
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he is doing as a narrator, so he never acknowledges the necessity to make a clear 
decision about what kind of reaction to Bartleby he finds morally acceptable. If 
we as readers do not know whether he fully understands the moral dimension of 
his tale, this is exactly the effect which the choice of a first-person narrator is 
intended to create. In the absence of an authoritative third-person narrator we are 
simply not expected to discern whether the lawyer does not want to say more than 
he does because by doing so he would damage himself or whether he cannot say 
more because he does not understand the moral challenge he is facing. Far from 
criticizing readers for their inability to fathom the lawyer’s mind, the narrative 
configuration of “Bartleby” encourages them to experience this inability as one of 
the central topics of the narrative. In the case of “Benito Cereno”, the picture 
looks entirely different. Here, the narrator uses the technique of limited 
omniscience as an effective means to attack both the story’s protagonist and the 
reader. The narrator’s insistence on Delano’s biased perception and the way in 
which he uses the deposition to disprove the American’s every opinion leave no 
doubt that he acts from a clear moral stance and does not allow for the possibility 
that Delano may not be blameworthy. We as readers are blameworthy in that we 
fail to understand that the narrator deliberately uses a limited third-person point of 
view because he – rightly – expects us to believe everything that a third-person 
narrator tells us. In Billy Budd, the situation is again completely different. While 
the narrator’s approach may be reminiscent of that found in “Bartleby”, it is not 
comparable because it is much more extreme in its ambiguity. The essence of this 
ambiguity lies in the narrator’s attitude towards his own narrative. Although he 
does not hide his omniscience, he pretends that he cannot shape his story at his 
own discretion, which is obviously not true. He invites readers to look for 
meaning in his story but also warns them that there is none. It is clear, in this 
context, that the narrator’s incongruous character portrayals are only a logical 
consequence of his general refusal to commit himself to the truth value of his 
statements. Another consequence of this refusal is the narrator’s attitude towards 
his readers. Since he himself does not seem to know the truth about the Billy 
Budd case, it would not make sense for him to criticize his readers for their failure 
to form a definite opinion about the moral issues of his story. He can even be said 
to legitimize such an undecided reaction by allowing his readers to glimpse at his 
own inability to make definite judgments. 
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 The second aspect which is crucial in defining the moral attitudes of the 
individual narrators is their use of Christian and classical metaphors. It is a 
fascinating feature of all threes stories that the selection and arrangement of 
metaphors can be shown to depend directly from the general narrative attitude of 
the narrator. In “Bartleby”, the Christian and classical images are used to 
represent opposing concepts of morality. The association of Bartleby with 
Christian images, the opposition of the scrivener with the Cicero bust and the 
mirroring of this opposition in the narrator’s own oscillation between charity and 
prudence is some of the best evidence to suggest that the lawyer is indeed aware 
of the moral concepts that are available to him. His refusal to privilege either 
concept – despite the final reference to Job – corresponds to his refusal to dismiss 
Bartleby and, on the level of narrative awareness, to his refusal to acknowledge 
the moral purport of his story and to specify the moral judgment that it passes on 
his own behavior. By contrast, “Benito Cereno” is characterized by a much more 
one-sided use of metaphors: They all serve to condemn the Spanish slave traders. 
Because most metaphors link the narrative to the horrible reality of slavery, it is 
virtually impossible to interpret them so that they do not discredit the Spaniards. 
In this case, too, the basic narrative decision to write a story whose form turns 
against its white protagonists determines the use of images which serve the same 
narrative purpose. The sparing use of classical allusions must also be considered 
from this perspective. It would not make sense for the narrator to present a dual 
set of categories because, like in “Bartleby”, this would create the impression that 
there are two different moral viewpoints from which the events of the story can be 
seen. In Billy Budd, finally, the narrator’s incongruous use of metaphors does not 
contribute to the establishment of moral categories at all. This refusal to assign 
moral labels to the metaphorical spheres of Christianity and antiquity is of course 
the exact correlate of the narrator’s general refusal to use his narrative authority to 
impose a binary pattern of god and evil on the complex moral dilemma which his 
story represents. The vividness of the Christian and classical metaphors makes 
them the ideal narrative device for the narrator to illustrate his far-reaching claim 
that the formal elaborateness of his narrative only serves to highlight its semantic 
emptiness. This unique use of metaphors in Billy Budd also reminds us that in all 
three stories considered in this paper it is important to interpret the imagery that 
the narrator uses in the context of his general narrative strategy. The source 
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domains of Christianity and classical antiquity do not carry inherently positive or 
negative connotations; the meaning which is attributed to them in each of the 
stories depends entirely on the narrative function which the concepts of 
Christianity and antiquity are intended to fulfill.  
 
 Taking a final look at “Bartleby”, “Benito Cereno” and Billy Budd, it is 
probably fair to say that all stories relegate concrete topics – such as Wall Street 
capitalism, slavery and mutiny – to the background and focus on basic moral 
questions that define the human character as such. Metaphorically speaking, the 
underlying moral questions are so deeply ingrained in the narrative fabric of all 
three narratives that the application of a particular surface topic and the 
specification of a particular setting are only needed to give the textual fabric an 
external shape. The important question in “Bartleby” is not whether lawyers are 
bad people or whether a Wall Street man can be expected to act charitably 
towards his “neighbor”. The important question is whether different moral 
concepts and standards can be accepted to exist side by side and whether a person 
must necessarily chose one concept and renounce the other. Similarly, in “Benito 
Cereno” it is not the issue of slavery that is most important. The narrator’s interest 
is in moral deficiencies that apply to the human condition in general and are not 
restricted to the issue of racism. Delano’s most obvious deficiency is his hubris, 
his belief that he is morally impeccable and thus in a position that allows him to 
judge other people. The slavery décor of the story only serves to illustrate what 
can happen if this mental attitude combines with greed and military power. The 
underlying message of Billy Budd is contained in the observation that in the 
domain of morality it is not possible to think in categories of good and evil – and 
also that we cannot expect to be guided in our decision by some supposedly 
omniscient authority.  
 
 If we try to form an abstraction of Melville’s short fiction – or at least, the 
three examples considered in this paper – we will find that it is very similar to 
Billy Budd in that it presents various possible responses to moral challenges but 
does not tell us which of these responses is to be preferred. The message which 
we as readers can deduce from this fact is, again, very similar to that of Billy 
Budd. Questions of morality and guilt – in all their myriad forms – are so complex 
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that we should not hope to find simple and definite answers. Neither should we 
expect literature to help us determine what is good and what is bad. The 
contribution that literature can make to our moral deliberations lies in the fact that 
every piece of fiction contains one figure whose reaction to the events of the 
narrative is closely connected with the author’s own attempts to come to terms 
with the moral challenges of life. This figure is the narrator. Thus, it makes sense, 
as I have done in my preceding analysis, to pay close attention to the particular 
“character” of the narrator, and in particular to the way in which he reflects on and 
responds to the moral challenges that his narrative presents to the reader. Even if 
such an approach runs the risk of conferring too much of a human-like character 
on a narratological construct, I am convinced that in the case of “Bartleby”, 
“Benito Cereno” and Billy Budd it is vindicated by the great care which Melville 
invests in constructing clearly distinguishable narrator-characters and in 
describing the different narrative strategies which they pursue in relating and 
evaluating the moral problems of the stories that they tell. In the end, apart from 
the conclusion concerning these strategies which have already been presented, the 
behavior of all narrators makes one thing very clear. Just like each of them must 
respond, in some way or other, to the moral dilemmata that they describe, so we 
as readers must be prepared to grapple with morally problematic questions. The 
clearest formulation of this imperative is offered by the uncompromising narrator 
of “Benito Cereno”: Because we, unlike the sun, the sea and the sky, are human 
beings, we cannot ignore the question of what constitutes morally acceptable 
behavior – we must continue to “moralize upon it”.  
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